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I. INTRODUCTION
Although nothing is certain in Washington, sweeping federal legislation
in the cigarette area is more likely now than has ever been the case. 1
Congress is currently considering several proposals for comprehensive
federal regulation of the cigarette market, 2 a market that has until now gone
largely untouched by government intervention. 3 Among those proposals, the
one that has received the most attention, and the one that in fact motivated
policy makers to look anew at the problems posed by cigarettes, is the
proposed national tobacco resolution (the "Proposed Resolution").4 The
Proposed Resolution, which has been advanced by a coalition of state
attorneys general and tobacco companies, would grant cigarette
manufacturers immunity from all class action and attorney general lawsuits
and punitive damages for past harms in exchange for changes in FDA
regulatory authority, limitations on advertising by tobacco companies, and
$368.5 billion in payouts over 25 years. 5
In a recent artide in the Yale Law Journal, two of us (Hanson and
Logue) made three general arguments regarding the cigarette market. 6 First,
we argued that the market for cigarettes is characterized by severe market
failures and hence is in need of extensive government regulation. 7 Given
that the current debate in Washington assumes the need for some type of
government action in the cigarette area, we will not restate those market
failures here. Instead, we will say only this: In light of evidence that
smokers typically begin smoking at a very early age, 8 tend to underestimate
the long-term health risks to themselves (and to others) of smoking, 9 often
underestimate the addictiveness of cigarettes, 1 0 and do not bear many of the

I.
2.
3.
4.
S.

·

6.
7.
8.
9.
10.

See Jeffrey Taylor & B rian Duffy, Bipartisan B ill Over Tobacco Is in the Works, WA LL ST. J. , Feb.
27, 1998, at A 3.
Id.
Jon D. Hanson & Kyle D. L ogue, The Costs of Cigarettes: The Economic Case for Ex Post
Incentive-Based Regulation, 108YA LE L.J. 1162 (1998).
ProposedResolution: For Settlement Discussion Purposes Only 6120/97 (on file with authors).
For a more complete description of the Proposed Resolution and its likely effects, see Hanson &
L ogue, supra note 3, at 1316-48.
Hanson & L ogue, supra note 3.
Id. at 1181-1262.
See Proposed Resolution, supra note 4, at 1.
See Hanson & L ogue, supra note 3, at 1186-93.
See id. at 1193-1221.
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costs associated with their own smoking, 1 1 we agree that the market for
cigarettes should not be left unregulated.
Second, we argued that, from a deterrence perspective, the most
promising type of regulation in the cigarette context is some form of ex post
incentive-based regulation-regulation that imposes the costs of smoking on
cigarette manufacturers as those costs arise, giving manufacturers incentives
to make cost-justifiably safer cigarettes and forcing cigarette pricing to
reflect the social costs of smoking. 12
Finally, we described how the Proposed Resolution takes just the wrong
approach, completely rejecting ex post incentive-based regulation and instead
expanding the use of other regulatory approaches (mainly command-and
control provisions) that have proven to be-and are widely regarded by
regulatory experts as being-inferior to incentive-based regulatory
approaches . 1 3
I n this article, we elaborate on one type of ex post incentive-based
regulation that was briefly outlined in the Yale article. 14 It is a regime that
we call Smokers' Compensation. 15 The principal goals of the regime would
be: (a) to exploit, rather than be exploited by, the informational advantage
that cigarette manufacturers have regarding the risks posed by their products;
(b) to force cigarette manufacturers, and hence cigarette consumers through
the price mechanism, to ta�e into account more of the social costs of
cigarettes than they currently do; (c) to create incentives for cigarette
companies to make safer cigarettes, indeed to compete with respect to
cigarette safety; (d) to establish a separate insurance pool for smoking-related
harms that is financed by smokers through the price of cigarettes, thereby
reducing nonsmokers' insurance premiums and taxes;16 and (e) to do all of
those things without producing administrative costs that outweigh the benefits
of the regime.

11.
12.
13.
14.
I 5.

16.

See id. at 1223-32.
See id. at 1263-1315.
See id. at 1316-48.
See id. at 1283-1315.
We use the tenn "Smokers' Compensation" to emphasize the k inship between our proposed regime
and perhaps the most prominent existing example of a causation-based, no-fault compensation
regime-namely, workers' compensation. We should emphasize, however, a key difference
between Smokers' Compensation and existing causation-based, no-fault regimes: The principal,
though not necessarily the sole, goal of Smokers' Compensation is deterrence, not compensation.
Establishing a separate insurance pool for smoking harms would remove those costs from existing
public and private health-insurance pools, insofar as smokers currently have insurance against
smoking-caused harms. Such segregation means lower premiums or taxes for nonsmokers and fills
any gaps in existing insurance arrangements to the extent smokers are currently without coverage
for smoking-related losses.
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Before undertaking this examination, however, a word of caution is in
oraer. This is not an exercise in legislative drafting. It is instead a starting
point for someone who has been given the task of drafting legislation or
creating regulations in this area and who is serious about correcting the
failures in the cigarette market in a way that stands a chance of achieving the
five goals mentioned above. Although we will discuss how a Smokers'
Compensation regime might be designed, we will still speak in general terms
and necessarily omit many details. This Article is also not intended to be a
neat, theoretically impermeable treatment of the questions of tobacco
regulation. The proposals herein are offered with an eye towards political
As such, many details necessarily must be deferred to
viability.
policymakers who are in a position to evaluate the real world implications of
the costs and benefits. At the very least, the Article aims to identify many
of the issues that should be the focus of any effort to construct a workable ex
post incentive-based regime.
Part II defines some key terms and briefly summarizes the basic case
for ex post incentive-based regulation over its alternatives. That Part also
briefly summarizes the problems with the Proposed Resolution. Part III
offers an introduction to the Smokers' Compensation idea. It presents a
decision-making framework in which to consider the subsequent proposals,
namely the inevitable tradeoff between accuracy and cost. Part III also
examines other existing and proposed alternative compensation systems that
might serve to guide development of a Smokers' Compensation system. Part
N describes our blueprint for a Smokers' Compensation regime and surveys
the questions that must be addressed in order to implement such a regime.
In that Part, we look at the accuracy-cost alternatives implicit in various
answers to the primary questions of system design: who is the decision
maker? ; who should be eligible to bring claims?; what damages should
claimants be entitled to?; how should claimants prove a smoking-related
injury?; and how would compensation costs be allocated among cigarette
manufacturers? Finally, in Part V we touch on a number of potential
administrative and political difficulties in constructing a viable Smokers'
Compensation system.
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II. THE CASE FOR EX POST INCENTIVE-BASED CIGARETTE
REGULATION17
A. Three Categories of Regulation
When comparing and contrasting various regulatory regimes, scholars
often divide the world of regulation into three general types: command-and
control regulation; peiformance-based regulation; and incentive-based
regulation. 18 The distinctions among these three categories are not perfect.
Thus, some examples of command-and-control regulation begin to shade into
performance-based regulation; and some examples of performance-based
regulation begin to look like incentive-based regulation. In fact, it is
probably most accurate to understand the three categories as three points
along a continuum, with command-and-control regulation at one end,
incentive-based regulation at the other end, and performance-based
regulation somewhere in the middle. Nevertheless, it is useful to maintain
the conceptual distinctions among the three types of regulation to enable us
to identify the costs and benefits of moving in one direction or the other
along the continuum.
Under command-and-control regulation, sometimes called "input
regulation, " the regulator imposes specific requirements on the firm. The
regulator in effect tells the regulated firm how specifically to run some aspect
of its business. In regulating pollution, for example, . the command-and
control regulator might prescribe specific steps that manufacturers must take,
or specific technologies that they must use, to reduce the level of pollution
that is emitted by their manufacturing processes. 1 9
Under peiformance-based regulation, by contrast, the regulator presents
manufacturers with a target of some sort, which the manufacturers are

17.
18.

19.

This Part draws on and summarizes the analysis in Hanson & L ogue, supra note 3, at 1173-78,
1263-81.
See generally Hanson & Logue, supra note 3, at 1173-78, 1263-81 (defining and comparing these
various forms of regulation and summarizing the literature regarding the scholarly consensus in
favor of incentive-based regulation).
There are many examples of command-and-control regulation in the Proposed Resolution. For
example, the warning requirements and the advertising restrictions that the Proposed Resolution.
would impose on manufacturers are best characterized as command-and-control regulations.
Similarly, if the FDA exercised its limited authority under the Proposed Resolution to mandate
particular "technologically feasible," "less hazardous tobacco products," it would do so in the form
of command-and-control regulations. Proposed Resolution, supra note 4, at 14.
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encouraged to meet. That target is sometimes called a "performance
standard. " The manufacturers are then left to decide how best to achieve the
target. One performance standard, for example, might be a maximum
quantity of pollution that a firm is allowed to emit over a given period of
time, such as that allowed by tradable pollution permits. Failure to achieve
the relevant target, however, would result in a fine or additional regulation.20
Although there is something to be said for performance-based
regulation over command-and-control regulation, 21 both impose roughly the
same informational demands on the regulator. Performance-based regulation,
when compared to command-and-control regulation, reflects a greater degree
of humility and skepticism with regard to how much the regulator can be
expected to know about the cutting-edge technology in a given industry. It
relies on the industry's (or the market's) information to_a greater extent than
command-and-control regulation. Nevertheless, both types of regulation
make substantial informational demands on the regulator. To see why this
is so, consider the following question: How is the performance-based
regulator to choose the appropriate target level of performance or the
appropriate fine for failing to meet that target? For example, how does
Congress or the EPA determine the aggregate level of air or water pollution
to permit? To answer such questions the regulator must have information
about not only the level of harm caused by different levels of pollution but
also the total social costs and benefits of both the activities that give rise to
the pollution and the potential solutions.
Incentive-based regulation is superior to command-and-control and
performance-based approaches because it requires less information of the
regulator, and because it relies more on the market to generate the desired
regulatory outcomes, than the other two approaches do. Under incentive
based regulation, the regulator simply forces the manufacturers to pay the
total costs of their manufacturing activities. The manufacturers are then left
to decide what to do about those costs, if anything. Thus, incentive-based
regulation does not, in any way, tell manufacturers how to run their business.
(as command-and-control regulation does). Nor does it require the regulator

20.

21.

The Proposed Resolution contains a couple of perfonnance-based standards. The best known
example is the so-called "look-back" provision, which would set target levels of underage smoking
that the industry would pay a fine for failing to meet.
If there is a performance standard or target that is assumed to be desirable, performance-based
regulation can be superior to command-and-control regulation as a means of achieving that standard,
for the reason already described-manufacturers have better infonnation. In addition, if we know
what the target standard is, then enforcement of such a standard is relatively easy (because of the
ease of monitoring compliance) compared to enforcement of command-and-control regulation,
where the regulator must constantly defer to the infonnational advantage of the manufacturer.
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to choose the ideal regulatory target (as performance-based regulation does).
It simply makes the industry pay its costs, and lets the market sort things out.
The general superiority of incentive-based regulation over command-and
control regulation in most settings is commonly accepted among efficiency
oriented scholars and is increasingly recognized by policy makers.22 Indeed,
most of the important debates in environmental regulation seem not to be
over whether to use market forces, but how best to use market forces as a
means of reducing pollution.
B. Ex Post vs. Ex Ante Incentive-Based Regulation

Consider one additional definitional distinction: the distinction between
"ex ante" and "ex post" incentive-based regulation. Under ex post
incentive-based regulation, as we define the term, the regulator waits until
after the harm occurs and then imposes the costs of that harm on the
particular manufacturer responsible for it. Thus the manufacturer, in making
its initial production decisions ex ante, will anticipate the possibility of such
ex post liability and will take into account the expected value of those
liability costs in deciding how much to invest in improving the safety of its
cigarettes and in deciding how much to charge consumers for its brand of
cigarettes. Under current law, we have a form of ex post incentive-based
regulation: tort law or products liability law.
Ex ante incentive-based regulation, on the other hand, tries to impose
those same expected accident costs on manufacturers before the harms
actually occur. The typical example of this type of regulation would be an
excise tax imposed on cigarettes. What is interesting is that the excise tax
seems to be the preferred form of regulation among most economists.
Indeed, among the economists writing about cigarettes, it seems to be the
only regulatory tool that is given serious consideration. Why do economists
have this preference for excise taxes? It is because a tax supposedly requires
less information on the part of the regulator than command-and-control or
performance-based regulation does. 23 Again, the idea is that the regulator
can just measure harm and impose it on the manufacturer.
There are two general reasons why ex ante incentive-based regulation
is inferior to the ex post version, especially in the cigarette context. First,
choosing the appropriate rate of tax requires the regulator (as in the case of
command-and-control and performance-based regulation) to have an

22.
23.

See Hanson & L ogue, supra note 3, at 1174-75.
See id. at 1268.
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enormous amount of information up front (at the time the tax rate is set)
about the costs and benefits of cigarettes, including the costs and benefits of
alternative cigarette designs. In contrast, under an ex post regime, costs
would be imposed on cigarette manufacturers only as the external harms
caused by cigarettes actually became manifest. Thus, although the regulator
would be responsible for sorting out after the fact what harms had been
caused by cigarettes and should be charged to manufacturers, it would be the
cigarette manufacturers who would decide up front how to make and market
cigarettes to minimize those costs.
Second, an excise tax, unlike an ex post approach, does not create
incentives for cigarette manufacturers to compete over safety. This is a very
basic point, but it is central to the argument for an ex post regime and to our
critique of the Proposed Resolution. 24 At best, an excise tax would impose
on each manufacturer the average per pack external costs for the whole
industry. Such a tax, however, provides no incentive for manufacturers to
make investments in developing and manufacturing safer cigarette designs
(such as nicotine-free cigarettes or low-carcinogen cigarettes) or in
identifying relatively low-risk smokers (people who are least likely to suffer
harmful effects from smoking). Any such innovations would cost a
manufacturer money-research and development costs among others-but
would provide essentially zero benefit to that manufacturer given that the
taxes are fixed (or, if variable, are assessed on a market share basis).
If the taxes are fixed, then, of course, nothing that a manufacturer does
can lower them. Even if the taxes vary to reflect the changes in the average
costs imposed by cigarettes, however, manufacturers will not invest to lower
those costs, because the benefit of such investments would be shared with the
whole industry in the form of a reduced industry-wide excise tax. Again,
each manufacturer would have a strong incentive to make no such safety
enhancing investments. This phenomenon is a special case of what policy
scholars call the "common pool" or "free rider" problem. We sometimes
refer to it as the "unraveling problem, " because, under such a scenario, the
market for safety improvements may unravel, as each manufacturer realizes
that making investments in safety enhancements is not in their financial best
interest.
We should emphasize that our position is not that command-and
control , performance-based regulation, and excise taxes should never be
used. In some non-cigarette situations (for example, in dealing with the
problems of air pollution created by automo,bile emissions), command-and-

24.

See infra Part 11.C.
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control or performance-based regulation, or perhaps an excise tax, may be
the only available options. This would be true if ex post incentive-based
regulation (of the type we describe in greater detail in this Article) were
considered impractical, perhaps because the harms associated with
generalized air pollution are too widely dispersed to give rise to ex post
damage claims brought by individual victims. It should be emphasized,
however, that the cigarette market presents a setting in which ex post
incentive-based regulation is available as a regulatory option. Therefore,
those types of regulations are not viable substitutes for ex post incentive
based regulation of the cigarette market, for the reasons already discussed.
Still, even in the cigarette context, command-and-control and performance
based regulation might be useful complements to an ex post incentive-based
regime, for example, as additional means of reducing underage smoking.25
C . Some Problems with the Proposed Resolution
Given the consensus in favor of incentive-based (and against command
and-control) regulation, one would hope that any proposal to regulate
cigarettes would rely most heavily on incentive-based approaches, with little
emphasis on command-and-control and performance-based regulation. In
fact, the Proposed Resolution takes just the opposite approach. It is
dominated by a renewed and strengthened emphasis on command-and-control
regulation, including everything from new warning requirements26 to new
FDA control over the level of nicotine27 and other ingredients28 in tobacco
products. In addition, the settlement contains the occasional performance
based approach-such as the "look back" provision designed to achieve
specific targets of underage smoking by various points in time29-but those
provisions, by virtually all accounts, involve penalties for failure to achieve
the relevant targets that are too weak or otherwise ineffective. 30 Moreover,
as we argued above, the way in which the penalties would be apportioned
among tobacco companies (essentially on a market-share basis) would
undermine each company's incentives to reduce underage smoking.31

25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.

See generally Hanson & L ogue, supra note 3, at 1315 (making this point in greater detail).
See Proposed Resolution, supra note 4, at 9-11.
ld. at l 5-17.
Id. at 19-20.
Id. at 24.
For a summary of the look-back provision and critiques of it, see Hanson & L ogue, supra note 3,
at 1331-36.
See generally Hanson & L ogue, supra note 3, at 1315 (making a fuller version of this point).
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Finally, the Proposed Resolution is especially remarkable for its
rejection of ex post incentive-based regulatory approaches.
sharply

curtailing products liability

In fact, by

law as a means of regulating

manufacturer behavior, the Proposed Resolution would eliminate the only
existing incentive-based system with any potential for internalizing the
external costs of smoking. The Proposed Resolution arguably includes an
incentive-based component, insofar as the costs imposed on manufacturers
are required to be passed through to consumers in the form of a price hike. 32
That mandated price hike would, like an excise tax, force manufacturers to
bear at least some of the costs of their products.

Viewing the Proposed

Regulation in that light, some scholars have complained that the price hike
is too small. 33

And some Senators and the Clinton administration have

recently suggested the possibility of increasing the price hike to some amount
closer to

$ 1 .50 per pack.34

In fact, there appears to be an emerging

consensus among commentators and policy makers that the regulatory effect
of the de facto excise tax needs to be enhanced and will have a greater
regulatory effect than that of other aspects of the Proposed Resolution. But
again, because of the common-pool problem, even an excise tax of $ 1 .50 per
pack would not create incentives for manufacturers to make safer cigarettes.

Ill. AN INTRODUCTION TO SMOKERS' COMPENSATION
As we have already mentioned, one type of ex post incentive-based
regulation of cigarettes is currently in effect-that is, products liability law.
And compared with the Proposed Resolution, we would prefer the status
quo, which may be imperfect but at least has the potential for producing the
sorts of deterrence incentives and pricing effects that we see as important.
In this Part, however, we explore one alternative to products liability law,
an administrative system of compensation and cost-internalization that we
call Smokers ' Compensation .
The following issues distinguish a Smokers' Compensation regime from
other conceivable ex post incentive-based approaches, including a products

32.
33.

34.

See Proposed Resolution, supra note 4, at 35.
A ccording to Jeffrey Harris, for instance, the proposed agreement would, if adopted, have the effect
of a $0.62 per pack excise tax on cigarettes. See Jeffrey E. Harris, Comments on Proposed
Resolution (last modified June 26, 1997) <http://web. mit. edu/jeffrey/harris/ACScomments. html>,
at 1-3 & tbl.2.
See Jeffrey Taylor, More Senators Seem to Back Increasing Cigarette Prices Beyond level in
Accord, WA LL ST. J. , Sept. 17, 1997, at A4.
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liability regime: (a) who the decision-maker would be, (b) who the claimant
would be, (c) what costs would be recoverable by a claimant, (d) what
evidentiary showing a claimant would have to make to receive compensation,
and (e) how a claimant's damages would be allocated among cigarette
-companies. 35 As we describe in greater detail below, one plausible version
of a Smokers' Compensation regime would (a) be decided by some type of
administrative tribunal, (b) be open only to smokers themselves or to those
who bring claims on behalf of smokers (e.g. , the smoker's estate or a
subrogated insurer), (c) allow recovery only for those costs that tend to be
covered under standard insurance and existing administrative compensation
regimes according to pre-determined schedules, (d) require at least
epidemiological evidence of a causal connection between the claimant's harm
and her smoking, and (e) allocate damages among cigarette companies, as
much as is feasible, according to each company's causal contribution to each
claimant's harms.
A. · The Tradeoffs Among Accuracy, Complexity, and Political Feasibility
Perfect cost internalization would be achieved only if all of the external
costs of smoking were included in the system and only if those costs were
perfectly allocated among cigarette manufacturers according to the extent to
which each company's cigarettes contributed to the harm.

In such a

perfectly accurate deterrence regime, each cigarette company would bear
the full costs of the harms that its cigarettes cause, but only those harms. But
to achieve such a world would require an incredibly complex cost
internalization system whose administrative costs would almost certainly
outweigh its deterrence benefits.

Indeed, with any regime that seeks to

create incentives to optimize deterrence, there is likely to be a tradeoff
between accuracy and complexity. 36 Because achieving the former would

3 5.
36.

The last two factors could also be understood as part of the same causal analysis.
A s Professor Kaplow has observed, increased accuracy in adjudication will not inevitably produce
deterrence gains. For example, Kaplow notes that, if the parties whose behavior is being regulated
can only foresee-at the time they decide whether and how to engage in the regulated behavior-the
average level of hann that their behavior may cause, then it would be a waste of resources to spend·
money to allocate damages ex post on a more fine-tuned basis. The deterrence benefits of such an
investment would be nothing. See Louis Kaplow, The Value ofAccuracy in Adjudication: An
Economic Analysis, 23 J. L EGA L STUD. 307, 3 13-14 ( 1994); David Rosenberg, The Causal
Connection in Mass Exposure Cases: A "Public Law" Vision of the Tort System, 97 HAR V. L . REv.
849 ( 1 984). Kaplow goes on to argue, however, that a different conclusion may apply if the
regulated parties have the ability to become informed regarding the actual risks posed by their
behavior-as opposed to average risk posed by this general type of behavior. Kaplow, supra note
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often require an increase in. the latter, the goal is to optimize-to pursue
accuracy until the next dollar in administrative costs incurred to achieve it
yields only one dollar in welfare gains from improved deterrence.
Of course, in designing a smokers' compensation system for the real
world, the goal of efficiency must compete with other goals and interests.
Our objective in this Article is to propose a system that would be politically
feasible and would, within the political constraints imposed, optimize the
complexity and accuracy considerations mentioned above. To make such a·
proposal, we will assume that within the current political environment the
following constraints are firmly in place. 37

First, the cigarette industry,

although potentially on the verge of being subjected to significant
governmental regulation, 38 has the political muscle39 to avoid a plan that does

37.

38.

39.

36, at 3 1 6-18. In that case, so long as the more accurate information can be expected to be reflected
in the ex post damage awards that the regulated parties will have to pay, and so long as the benefits
of gathering the information (in terms of reduced ex post awards) will exceed the costs of
information gathering, the regulated parties will have an incentive to acquire the relevant
information and then to take it into account. Id. at 3 1 7. These conclusions are consistent with the
reasoning underlying our justification of ex post incentive-based regulation of the cigarette industry.
Our argument depends on the assumption that the tobacco industry, given the incentive to do so, can
make ex ante determinations of what their relative share of the smoking-caused harms will be in
society.
To be clear, it is not our view that many of the political constraints should be constraints. Indeed,
as a review of our previously published, related work would suggest, we would prefer a world in
which most of the constraints that we are about to describe did not exist See generally Hanson &
Logue, supra note 3; Jon D. Hanson & Kyle D. Logue, The First-Party Insurance Externality: An
Economic Justificationfor Enterprise Liability, 16 COR NELL L. REv. 1 29 ( 1990); Steven P. Croley
& Jon D. Hanson, The Nonpecuniary easts ofAccidents: Pain-and-Suffering Damages in Tort Law,
108 HAR V. L. REv. 1 787 (1995); Steven P. Croley & Jon D. Hanson, Rescuing the Revolution: The
Revived Cas� for Enterprise Liability, 9 1 MICH. L. REv. 683 (1993); Steven P. Croley & Jon D.
Hanson, What Liability Crisis? An Alternative Explanationfor Recent Events in Products Liability,
8YA LEJ. O NREG. I ( 1 991).
Cf David E. Rosenbaum, Senators Agree on Forcing Up Cigarette Price, N.Y TIMES, Mar. 28,
1 998, at A l ("No other legislation Congress is likely to vote on this year would lead to such
fundamental changes in the society. President Clinton has called it the most important public health
measure in years.").
The tobacco industry is, and has long been, a political powerhouse. The industry was described in
1 979 by Senator Edward M. Kennedy as follows: "[D]ollar for dollar, they're probably the most
effective lobby on Capitol Hill." Robert Pear, A New leaf; Now, the Archenemies Need Each Other,
N.Y. TIMES, June 22, 1 997, at D I . Within the last several years, the tobacco industry's lobbying
efforts have grown particularly intense. In 1997, those efforts included expenditures ofover $30
million and the employment of such political heavyweights as Howard Baker, George Mitchell, and
Ann Richards. See Maureen Dowd, Integrity Clearance Sale, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 20, 1 997, at A l 3.
Also in 1 997, Philip Morris was the top soft money contributor in the United States, donating
$ 1 ,253,253, mostly to the Republican Party. R.J. Reynolds contributed $394,774 in soft money;
Brown & Williamson $1 70,000; the Tobacco Institute $100,000; and U.S. Tobacco $97 ,650. Center
for Responsive Politics, 1997 Soft Money Donations (posted Dec. 30, 1 997)
<http://www.crp.org/pubs/parties/soft97 I.html>; Center for Responsive Politics, Soft Money Special
.
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not meet at least some of its interests, particularly its interest in making its
liability costs more predictable. 40

We also assume that a complete

prohibition of cigarette sales, at least among adults, is not a viable political
option. 41 More generally, regulations that would result in the bankruptcy of
several prominent cigarette manufacturers are unlikely to be adopted. 42 Nor
are any proposals that would ultimately lead to a substantial black market in
cigarettes. 43 We assume further that there is a widely held perception among

40.

41.

42.
43.

Release (posted Feb. 4, 1998) <http://www.crp.org/crpdocs/feb98/softmoneyrelease.html>. In
addition, those entities' political action committees have made $ 1 ,024,884 in direct contributions
to candidates and parties in the 1 997-98 campaign cycle. Center for Responsive Politics, CRP
Special Interest Categories: Tobacco (visited Feb. 1 6, 1 998) <http://www.crp.org/cgi
win/org.exe?A 02>. This year, cigarette producers will likely make record contributions, although
(or perhaps because) their political clout is clearly on the wane. See Jill Abramson, Tobacco
Industry Steps Up Flow of Campaign Money: Proposed Settlement Leads to Record Giving Even
as Political Oppposilion Grows, N.Y. TIMES Mar. 8, 1 998, at A l . Though not what it once was, the
industry's "political influence remains substantial." Rosenbaum, supra note 38, at AIO.
The industry claims that its primary interest is in making its costs predictable. See irifra text
accompanying notes 1 73-74 (quoting the Proposed Resolution); Rosenbaum, supra note 38, at AIO
("[Ilhe industry has insisted on protection from lawsuits based on smoking�related illnesses. One
of the industry's main goals is to have a degree of certainty about how much money it will have to
pay in legal claims."); Congressional Testimony ofN.G. Brookes, Chairman and Chief Executive
Officer of Brown Williamson Tobacco Corporation, Jan. 29, 1 998, 1 998 WL 899 1465. ("What·
does the industry get in return? Our primary benefit is a l imited amount of financial stability from
the resolution of some product liability claims against-the industry." "[Those civil liability
limitations] are valuable to the industry because they provide some stability to our business. We
defended product liability cases for more than 40 years before entering into the current settlement.
But we also recognize that the court system can sometimes be unpredictable. The civil liability
provisions ofthe Proposed Resolution help us by allowing us to predict our future with some degree
of certainty."); David E. Rosenbaum, Tobacco Leaders Refuse to Budge on Pact, N.Y.TIMES, Feb.
28, 1 998, at A 1 6 (describing how top tobacco executives testified that "they would never agree to
modify their advertising and marketing practices unless the lawmakers gave the industry substantial
protection against lawsuits"); Hatch Says Tobacco Money Will not Be Used for Tax Cuts,
CONGRESS DAILY, 1 998 WL 6604893 (quoting Senator Hatch: "I believe that consensus is
developing around the idea of including liability provisions in a comprehensive anti-tobacco bill").
See, e.g., Congressional Testimony of Attorney General Gale Norton before the, Senate Commerce
Committee, Feb. 26, 1 998, 1 998 WL 8992534 ("I think it is naYve to assume that 40-50 million
current addicted smokers in the United States will simply quit using tobacco products. As the
country experienced during Prohibition, it is more likely that a ban will result in illegal trafficking
and smuggling of the product.").
See, e.g., Brookes Testimony, supra note 40; Norton Testimony, supra note 41 (providing a lengthy
discussion of the problems with bankruptcy).
See, e.g., Rosenbaum, supra note 38, at AIO ("[S]ome [politicians] have cautioned that the price [of
cigarettes] cannot be pushed so high that an illegal market develops."); David E. Rosenbaum, Fight
Against Big Tobacco Emboldens Democrats, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 16, 1998, at A l 2 (paraphrasing Newt
Gingrich as saying that "it was important not to make cigarettes so expensive that a black market
developed"); Norton Testimony, supra note 4 1 ("Contraband dealers are not going to be subject to
federal, state or local regulation, will not be concerned with preventing youth state or local
regulation, will not be concerned with preventing youth from having access to products, and are
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lawmakers that the tort system (and the jury system) are often random and
lottery-like and that juries are not capable of accurately deciding cases with
complex, scientific evidence. Despite distrust of the tort system, we assume
that any regulation protecting or immunizing the cigarette industry from the
threat of tort law cannot appear to provide the cigarette industry with
unprecedented protection. 44

Put differently, cigarette-industry regulations

similar in kind and scope to those previously applied to other industries are
likely the path of least political resistance. Additionally, we perceive in the
tobacco debates a common position that notions of personal responsibility on
the part of smokers must factor into regulation-that smokers who knew that
smoking was potentially harmful should not receive a large windfall.45
Finally, a proposal has a greater chance of being enacted; we suspect, if it
would have the effect of substantially increasing government revenues or
reducing government expenses.

It is within the parameters established by

those political constraints that we seek to balance deterrence accuracy and
administrative costs. 46
A great deal in administrative costs could be saved (and hence
deterrence could be purchased relatively cheaply) if three things were true.

First, all smoking-related injuries would be "signature diseases." (They
would, in other words, be caused exclusively, or nearly so, by smoking.)
Second, smokers would be steadfastly loyal to their favorite brands of
cigarettes, sticking to their preferred brand as long as they smoke. And
third, all smoking-caused damages would be tangible and easily measured.
In such a cheap-deterrence world, the Smokers' Compensation analysis
would be greatly simplified. If a claimant had one of the signature diseases,
the system could easily place liability on the manufacturer that caused the
harm for an appropriate amount, and the costs of smoking would be
appropriately internalized.
The good news is that the ideal world is not as far from the real world
as most readers might assume. Certain diseases, most notably lung cancer
and chronic lung disease, are significantly more common among smokers

44.
45.
46.

certainly not likely to be easily brought into court to compensate those injured. ").
Cf Rosenbaum, supra note 38, at A l ("The tobacco companies are such pariahs in the public's eye
that few lawmakers can afford to vote for a bill that the industry endorses. ").
See Hanson & L ogue, supra note 3, at 1350.
I t is important to note that these political assumptions represent our best estimates of the practical
constraints facing any tobacco proposal, including our Smokers' Compensation proposal. Differing
assumptions may change the calculus and suggest different policy choices. A gain, by describing
these political constraints, we do not mean to endorse them. I ndeed, we find many of them
lamentable and accept them on pragmatic grounds only because of our impression that they are
unlikely to change before lawmakers enact some sweeping form of cigarette regulation.

·
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than they are among nonsmokers and smoking is very likely to be the central
cause of those diseases among smokers. 47 We will sometimes refer to these
as "quasi-signature diseases." There is also evidence that smokers are

extremely brand loyal. 4 8 Moreover, a substantial portion of smoking costs

is economic and may be easily and accurately measured. 49 Thus: except for

the sheer volume of claims that would be brought, we are hard pressed to
imagine a commonly used consumer product for which a deterrence-oriented
ex post compensation system could be more easily and effectively adopted.

47.

48.

For example, 87% of all cases of lung cancer, a disease that kills 123, 000 Americans annually, are
attributable to smoking, though only 30% of the population smokes. To put the point differently;
a smoker is 22.4 times more likely to die of lung cancer than is a nonsmoker. For chronic lung
diseases, such as emphysema, the numbers are 72% and 9. 6 times. Other diseases exhibit similar
incidence levels in smokers: for example, mouth cancer (89% and 27.5 times), laryngeal cancer
(74% and 10. 5 times), and esophageal cancer (66% and 7. 6 times). See Patrick Remington,
Assessing the Health Effects of the Proposed Tobacco Settlement (Working Paper: Proceedings of
the Conference on the So-Called Global Tobacco Settlement: Its Implications for Public Health and
Public Policy) at 8, tbl. I.
Professor Pollay and his co-authors recently summarized the evidence on brand loyalty as follows:
The cigarette industry is . . . well known for its phenomenally high brand loyalty,
the highest of all consumer product categories . . . . A relatively low rate of brand
switching is evident, typically 10% or less . . . . There is nominal switching within
brand families (e.g., from Brand X milds to Bran.d X lights), which is of little
consequence to a firm's net profit. High brand loyalty resulting from nicotine
"satisfaction" of those addicted makes it difficult and expensive to convert
competitors' customers. Most of the brand switching that does occur is by older,
health-concerned, or symptomatic smokers trading down, typically within a brand
family, to products with lower tar and nicotine labeling, in the misguided belief that
those products are safer. As a result, the net present value of gaining the trade of
these older customers is low compared with the value inherent in attracting young
starters, the vast bulk of whom will be highly brand loyal for many years . . . .
Richard W. Pollay, et al., The Last Straw? Cigarette Advertising and Realized Market Shares
Among Youths and Adults, 1 979-93, 60 J. O F M KT G I (1996) (citations omitted); See also Joe B.
Tye, et al., Tobacco Advertising and Consumption: Evidence of a Causal Relationship, 8 J. Pue.
HEA LTH PoL'Y 492, 493 (1987) ("Cigarettes enjoy one of the most tenacious brand loyalties of any
consumer product."); Philip H. Dougherty, A.MA. s Assault on Tobacco, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 12, 1985,
at 029 ("Unlike most products you could name, cigarettes engender considerable brand loyalty.");
OFFICE O N SMO KING & HEA LTH, U.S. DEP 'T OF HEA LTH & HUMA N SER VS. , REDUCING THE HEA LTH
CO NSEQUENCES OF SMO KING: 25YEARS OF PRO GRESS 507 (1989) [hereinafter SUR GEO N GENERA L'S
PROGR ESSREPORT] (reviewing studies that indicate that fewer than I 0% f smokers change brands
in any given year and that "[m]uch of the limited brand switching that occurs is necessarily between
brands of the same company").
One study estimated that the economic costs of smoking in direct health care costs and lost
productivity were $100 billion in 1993. A MER ICA N CA NCER SO CIETY, CA NCER FA CTS &
FIGURES-1997 23 (1997). We will describe losses as "economic" or "pecuniary" if they are
conventionally characterized that way. Our view, however, is that many so-called "economic"
losses are actually nonpecuniary losses that can be readily measured.
. See Croley & Hanson, The
Nonpecuniary Cost 'ofAccidents, supra note 37, at 1857-61.
'

49.
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Nevertheless, the cheap-deterrence conditions are not always met, at
least not entirely. For instance, although smoking is known to increase the
risk of heart disease, there are a number of other potential causes of heart
disease as well.

Similarly, some smokers do occasionally switch brands.

Insofar as the real world diverges from the cheap-deterrence world, it
becomes necessary to weigh the value of increased accuracy in attaching
injury costs to manufacturers against the administrative costs of achieving
that accuracy.

A similar tradeoff between accuracy and administrability

exists with respect to calculating real-world damages.so
In the following section, we explore how the balance between accuracy
and complexity in adjudication has been struck in a number of real-world
regulatory contexts that are similar (and dissimilar) in important ways to the
cigarette context and in which political constraints similar to those we
highlighted above played a role. Then in Part IV, we describe a range of
options for how the tradeoff between accuracy and complexity might
plausibly be made in connection with a Smokers' Compensation regime.

B. Rea� World Models for Smokers' Compensation
Causation-based administrative alternatives to tort law are by no means
strangers to the legal landscape.s1 Workers' compensation systems usually
provide the exclusive remedy for employees injured on the job in every

50.

51.

One implication of this analysis of the tradeoffbetween accuracy and complexity is that, before any
new regulatory regime is adopted, policymakers should dedicate some resources (time, effort,
perhaps money on research) to examining further the extent to which there are signature smoking
diseases and the extent to which smokers are brand loyal.
Professors Abraham and Liebman have drawn a distinction between three types of compensation
systems: loss based, causation based, and fault based. Kenneth S. Abraham & Lance Liebman,
Private Insurance, Social Insurance, and Tort Reform: Toward a New Vision of Compensation for
ll/ness and Injury, 93 Colum. L. Rev. 75, 86 (1993). Under a loss-based system, a claimant must
show that she has suffered a loss. The source of the loss and the circumstances in which the loss
occurred are largely irrelevant. Examples of a loss-based system include any private or public first
party health, life, or disability insurance. Under a causation-based approach, by contrast, the
claimant must show not only that she suffered a loss but also that it was the result of a particular
type of cause. For example, under worker.i' compensation, the claimant must show not only her loss
but also that it was work related. Finally, under the fault-based approach, the claimant must show
a) that she suffered a loss, b) caused by a particular party, c) who was negligent or otherwise at fault.
The tort system is the obvious example. Smokers' Compensation is, as we have said, a causation
based approach. Abraham and Liebman do not attribute any special deterrence advantage to
causation-based compensation systems, but rather focus on fault-based approaches as a potential
source of deterrence. Id. at 87-88. Even with respect to fault-based regimes, however, Abraham
and Liebman are skeptical that the deterrence benefits are as great as is claimed, especially in cases
involving long-latency periods. Id.
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state. 52 Federal causation-based compensation systems include the Black
Lung Benefit Program for miners suffering from lung disease and the
National Vaccine Injury C ompensation Program for victims of illnesses
contracted from immunizations. 53

The Dalkon S hield C laimants Trust,

established through settlement of a class-action lawsuit, provides an example
of a privately-developed al ternative to tort l aw.

Those examples il lustrate

how other compensation systems have dealt with the five factors-who
decides, who brings claims, which costs are covered, what evidentiary
showing is required, and how to allocate damages-when juggling accuracy,
administrability, and political constraints.

Perhaps more important, those

examples, taken together, deliver a fairly clear message that although state
and federal legislatures have occasionally been willi ng to create some tort
law immunity for some industries, they have rarely done so without
simultaneously substituting some form of ex post compensation system in its
place. Thus, the tobacco industry, in lobbying for the Proposed Resolution,
appears to be seeking special treatment not just among most product
manufacturers, who have long been and would remain subject to tort
penalties, but also among that tiny minority of industry groups that have been
granted substantial tort l aw protection.

1 . Workers ' Compensation
Workers' compensation is a causation-based compensation system that
functions largely outside of the courts and provides the exclusive remedy in

most worker injury cases. 54 The details vary from state to state, but the basic

form is usually similar. 55 A workers' compensation claim is initiated by the
injured employee, who notifies his employer and then seeks medical care.
C laimants are required to bring forth

52.
53.

54.

55.

(1) evidence substantiating proof of

,
U.S. C HA MB ER OF CO MMERC E, 1 994 A NALYSI S OF wORKER S CO MP ENSA TIO N LAW S at vii ( 1 994).
For a brief description ofthe Childhood Vaccination Compensation Program, see Robert L. Rabin,
Some Thoughts on the Efficacy ofa Mass Toxics Administrative Compensation Scheme, 52 Mo. L.
REV. 95 1 , 955- 60 (1993). The Black Lung program is discussed in PETER S . BARTH, THE TRAG EDY
OF BLACK LU NG: FEDERAL CO MPENSA TIO N FOR OCCUPA TIO NAL DI SEA SE (1987).
See Note, Exceptions to the Exclusive Remedy Requirements of Workers ' Compensation Statutes,
96 HAR V. L. REv. 1 64 1 ( 1 993). Due to administrative delays, inadequate benefits, and frequent
contests about compensation or degree of impairment, there have been doctrinal exceptions carved
out of the general "exclusive remedy" doctririe. These include the "dual capacity" exception
(allowing employees to sue employers for torts based on independent duties generated by
nonemployer-employee relationships), and the exceptions for suits against parent/sibling
corporations, for intentionally inflicted torts, and for contribution and indemnity from third-parties.
The procedures and structure described here are drawn primarily from New York.
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emplo yment, 56

(2) factual information regarding the workp lace;

medical records detailing the injury.58

and

(3)

The employer or the employer's

insurer, no t the employee, pays for necessary medical care.59 An injured
wo rker may co llect actual medical expenses and lost earnings. 60

The lost

earnings are awarded after only a short wait, and amo unt to a fraction,
usually two-thirds, of earnings up to a statewide maximum. 61 Most workers'

co mpensation s ystems also award scheduled awards for partial permanent
disability, such as loss of a limb, but do not explicitly compensate intangible
lo sses, such as pain and suffering. 62 In nearly all jurisdictio ns, wo rkers'
co mpensatio n decisio ns are made by an adminis trative law judge or panel,
and usually may be appealed to the wo rkers ' compensatio n board.
Mo st states require employers to carry workers'
insurance,

which co vers wo rkers'

compensatio n awards.

co mpensatio n ·
When the

emplo yer does no t comply with the insurance requirer:.nent, many s tates
follo w New York in establishing so me type of an Uninsured Emplo yees
Fund which immediately compensates the emplo yee and retains the righ t to
later sue the uninsured emplo yer for indemnification. 63

56.
51.

58.

59.

60.
6 I.
62.

63.

See THOMAS F. MANCUSO, HELP FOR THE WORKING WOUNDED 203 ( 1976).
Id (noting "the e of work done and the work exposures to specific dusts, fumes, mists, gases, noise,
etc; the presence or absence of ventilation control measures; the presence or absence of protective ·
clothing, including respirators that may be required; information as to whether air-sampling and
measurements of toxic substances were done, where, when, and how often").
Id. ("These would include the medical examinations and tests, like chest x-ray, blood and urine
analyses, done at the time of hiring and subsequent tests at the plant during the course of
employment.").
Subrogation is an issue only where a third party is either partially or fully responsible for the
employee's injuries. The employee may bring a suit against the third party for full damages
regardless of the outside party's level of culpability. The third party, in return, can sue the employer
for contribution, and the employer is then said to have a "lien" on the employee's winnings for any
WC benefits previously paid. See William Bassin, An Analysis of Employer Contribution to Third
Parties Under Workers ' Compensation Statutes, 30 TORT & INS. L.J. 844 ( 1995).
See Martin Minkowitz, Introduction to Workers ' Compensation Law, 460 PLI/Lit 1 1 ( 1 993).
Id.
Most states do, however, provide for cases of mental distress-especially mental injuries resulting
from "sudden" work-related instances-cumulative trauma, and rehabilitation expenses. See Gary
T. Schwartz, Waste, Fraud and Abuse in Workers ' Compensation: The Recent California
Experience, 52 Mo. L. REv. 983 (1993); see also Donald T. DeCarlo & Martin Minkowitz, Workers '
Compensation and Employers ' Liability Law: Recent Developments, 26 TORT & INS. L. J. 444
( 1 99 1 ).
See MINKOWITZ, supra note 60, at 1 0.

[Vol.

S outhern Illinois University Law Journal

538

22

The historical forces behind the state-by-state adoption of workers'
compensation laws were strikingly parallel to the forces behind the current efforts to adopt new forms of cigarette-industry regulation.

Prior to

enactment of workers' compensation laws, employers had long enjoyed
virtually complete tort law immunity because of the assumption of risk
defense and similar defenses available to manufacturers.

For numerous

reasons,64 that state of affairs began to change in the early twentieth
century. 65 For example, according to one study, the known injury values
for 55 of the work-injury cases filed against the U. S. Steel company in Ohio
between

1 898 and 1915 indicate that the " market value" of workers' injuries
1).66
"What these figures roughly

increased sevenfold (see Figure

demonstrate is that . . . both juries and judges were more and more inclined
to shift that social cost of work-sustained injury over to the corporate balance
sheet. This spiraling injury value phenomenon was well known to employers
generally. " 67

64_

65.

66.
67.

Several states passed statutes severely limiting the traditional employers' defenses to liability. For
example, Ohio passed the Norris Act in 1 9 1 0 which gutted the "fellow servant" rule by expanding
the definition of superior servants. See PAUL B. BELLAMY, A HISTORY OF WORKMEN'S
COMPENSATION 1898-191 s: FROM COURTROOM TO BOARDROOM 38 ( 1 997). And California passed
a similar act, the Roseberry Act, in 1 9 1 1 which abolished the common law defenses and imposed
liability without regard to negligence for injuries sustained by the employee in the course of his
employment. See Rita Maroney McPeake, Managing the Private Law Library 1 992: Trends, Ideas
and Solutions: Workers ' Compensation Law, 335 PU/Pat 408 ( 1 992).
DON DEWEES, DAVID DUFF & MICHAEL TREBILCOCK, EXPLORING THE DOMAIN OF ACCIDENT LAW:
TAKING THE FACTS SERIOUSLy 349 ( 1996) (hereinafter DEWEES, DUFF & TREBILCOCKl ("When
workers' compensation insurance was first introduced, the tort law applicable to workplace
accidents was in a process of rapid evolution. The nineteenth century doctrines of voluntary
assumption of risk, the fellow-servant rule, and contributory negligence-all of which had acted as
bars to tort recovery by injured workers-were being transformed or discarded, and workers were
succeeding in an increased number of cases." (footnotes omitted)).
See Bellamy, supra note 64, at 1 69.
Id. at 1 70-7 1 .

Smokers' Compensation

1 998]

539

Fi1rure 1
EXTRAPOLATED CLAIM VA LUES
THREE YEAR P ERIODS 1 898-1 9 1 5
-

$1 200

LINE OF BEST FIT

$1 000
$800
$600
$400
$200
$0 -'4-r......-..,-r-T-r-r-.,..-.,...,-r-r-.,...,-r-,-"
'12 '14

D

CLAIM VAL U E S

At the same time, lawmakers became serious about adopting greater worker
protections outside of tort law. 6 8 Underlying both types of changes were
numerous social , political, and economic shifts that combined to make
judges, juries, and legislatures more sensitive to the plight of injured
workers . 69
Broadly speaking , as Progressive notions of national

68.

69.

See GRATTET T. RYKEN, AT PLAy IN THE FIELD OF THE LAW: PROGRESSIVE REFORMERS AND THE
TRANSFORMATION OF INDUSTRIAL ACCIDENT LAW 56 ( 1994). Ryken claims that legislators, seeing
the problem of industrial accidents as a public health concern amidst a messy legal doctrine of
private contract. "created a space for the state, as representative of the public. to become a kind of
third party to the employment contract. The state's job would be to ensure that the contract did not
produce any harms to the public health and welfare." See also Paul Raymond Gurtler, The Workers ·
Compensation Principle: A Historical Abstract of the Nature of Workers · Compensation, 9
HAM LINE J. Pue. L. & PoL ' Y 285, 292 ( 1988) ("[H]eavy reliance on tort theory actually led to the
eventual enactments of Employers' Liability Statutes across the country. However, tort theory, at
best, only played the limited role of restoring 'the [injured] employee to a position no worse than
that of a stranger injured by the negligence of the employer . . . . ' Quite obviously, a new legal
principle was needed.").
For a description of some of the historical factors surrounding the rise ofworkmens' compensation.
see Bellamy, supra note 64, at 24, 1 09, 1 20 & 205.
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responsibility took root, the discourse regarding industrial accidents was
transformed from purely a matter of private contract between master and
servant into a major public health concern. 70
In light of those historical forces, workers ' compensation laws have
often been described as a compromise solution among the various interests
at stake . 71 Employers escaped the growing threat of tort damages but, in
exchange , had to accept partial responsibility for all work-related injuries
and deaths.
Particularly because of its institutional advantages in

aggregating, managing and accumulating injury statistics, corporate America
is said to have had a strong economic motive to trade rising compensation
awards and uncertain liability for predictably capped damage amounts . 72
Arguably, some injured workers, who otherwise may have faced the obstacle

of overcoming one or more employer tort-law defenses, also benefited from
the more certain and more immediate, albeit less generous , awards of
workers' compensation laws. 73 In short, the reduced administrative cost and
the greater certainty regarding the outcome of each individual case
represented a savings to both sides .

The experience of workers' compensation systems indicates that the
primary goals motivating them have been reasonably well served.
Administrative costs constitute 1 5 3 -20 3 of total costs of claims in U . S .
workers ' compensation systems (and only around 103 o f the workers'
4
compensation system in Ontario) . 7 In contrast, the administrative costs of

70.
71.

72.

73.

74.

See Ryken, supra note 68, at 19.
Compare BELLAMY, supra note 64, at 1 84 (noting that "the refonn received the unflinching support
of the state's large manufacturing employers . . . . At least part of the impetus for pushing for the
refonn lay in the recent passage of the Norris Act, which severely delimited the employer defenses
of contributory negligence and the fellow servant rule . . . ) with U.S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR,
SUMMARY OF STATE WORKMENS' COMPENSATION LAW, LABOR LAW SERIES No. 10 ( 1 997)
("Workmens' compensation laws are intended to assure prompt payment of benefits to employees
injured in the course of their employment or to the dependents of those killed, regardless of fault,
and with a minimum of legal fonnality.").
See, e.g., BELLAMY, supra note 64, at 206 ("The large industrial, transportation and insurance
corporations conducted operations large enough to amass the actuarial data required to come to an
understanding of the predictable course of employee injuries, examined over time."). Note that
workers' compensation costs did not reflect a pure cost increase to employers who were then able
to lower wages because of the credible promise of ex post compensation that they provided.
DEWEES, DUFF & TREBILCOCK, supra note 65, at 347-48, 396.
BELLAMY, supra note 64, at 37-40. The traditional defenses were: assumption of risk, contributory
negligence, and the fellow-servant rule. Note, however, that, by the early 20th century, those
defenses had been largely undennined by state statutes outlawing traditional defenses, see supra
note 65--{)6 and accompanying text, and the applicable negligence standard may have expanded into
a de facto strict liability rule, see BELLAMY, supra note 64, at 202. Thus, workmens' compensation
may have merely "refonned the system by freezing it in stasis." Id.
See DEWEES, DUFF & TREBILCOCK, supra note 65, at 393-94.
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the tort system eat up closer to 50 % of the total costs of claims. 75 Workers'
compensation benefits in this country typicall y are paid within three weeks
to four months of when a cl aim is initiated, whereas the del ay in most tort
claims (at l east those made in federal courts) is between fifteen to twenty
months.76
Although workplace-accident deterrence· is not the primary goal of
workers' compensation systems, it bears noting that those systems have had
significant deterrence benefits.77 Professors Dewees, Duff, and Trebilcock
have summ arized most of the empirical evidence comparing the efficacy of
workers' compensation programs to alternative or supplementary regul atory
options,

incl uding tort l aw, command-and-control style administrative

regulation,7 8 criminal sanctions, informational policies, and tax and insurance
instruments.

In their opinion, the evidence reflects well on workers'

compensation programs.
As they concl ude, the
operation of the workers' compensation system does reduce worker injury
rates and that for high-risk industries and risk-rated firms this reduction is
substantial , although the absolute magnitude of the effect is subject to
enormous uncertainty. We accept the evidence that this effect is greater
than that created by the tort system or that created by U . S. federal

occupational safety and health regulation. 79

75.
76.

77.
78.

79.

Id. at 394.
Id. These statistics must be viewed with caution, however. The costs of administering occupational
disease claims and the time necessary for administering such claims are significantly higher than
that of average workers compensation claims (though still significantly lower than that of the
average tort claim). Id. It seems likely that at least some of the special costs and delays created by
disease claims under workers' compensation systems would be present in many of the claims
brought under a Smokers' Compensation system.
See id. at 386 ("Workers' compensation is designed primarily to compensate workers, with
deterrence of harmful behavior as a secondary goal.").
Id. at 365 (explaining, as we would predict, that "[m]ost of the economics literature argues that
OSHA has set inappropriate standards, and even those who tend to support a significant regulatory
role for OSHA have difficulty with the existing type of standards").
Id. at 382; see id. at 378-82 (summarizing various studies); see also id. at 386 ("The most dramatic
findings is that of Moore and Viscusi, who conclude that the occupational fatality rate in the United
States would have been 40% higher were it not for the deterrent effect of workers' compensation,
implying that workers' compensation has been far more effective in saving workers' lives than
OSHA, for which the reduction in risk levels has been estimated to be as low as 2o/o-4%." (citation
omitted)); id. at 389 (explaining how workers' compensation system has such useful deterrence
effects).
·
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Indeed, in their view, the "relatively impressive perfonnance of the workers'

compensation system, and its considerable advantages and modest
disadvantages relative to tort, may explain why criticism of workers'
compensation over many decades has consistently led to recommendations
for refonn and adjustment rather than for abolition. "80
2. Childhood Vaccination Compensation Program (CVCP)

The CVCP creates something of a hybrid system between a fault-based
system and a causation-based compensation system. A party injured by one
of the covered childhood vaccines files a petition with the U.S. Claims Court
along with certain infonnation necessary for a finding that compensation is
due. The Court then appoints a special master to conduct hearings and make
findings of fact and conclusions of law. The master is empowered to require
evidence, including testimony, production of documents, and hearings.
There is no discovery, cross-examination, pleadings , or trial . If neither
party contests the master' s findings, the court must accept them. Otherwise,
the court will review the evidence and make a detennination and award
damages . Claimants are not responsible for establishing causation by a
standard of "scientific certainty . " Rather, the injured party is responsible for
producing documents , reports, and any infonnation regarding the nature,
causation, or aggravation of a specific illness, which the special master will
weigh according to a "preponderance of the evidence" standard .
Compensation is contingent upon the injured party's showing either that ( 1 )
she has experienced one of the four injuries or conditions listed on the
vaccine injury table, or (2) in cases involving injuries not listed on the table
or outside the stringent time frame, that her injury is more likely than not
81
linked to the vaccine.
The program compensates for economic losses of unreimbursed medical
costs , lost wages, and reasonable attorney' s fees. It also allows up to
$250,000 in pain and suffering damages at the discretion of the judge, and
a flat $250,000 death benefit.
Damage awards are paid by a fund
administered by the Secretary of Health and Human Services and financed

80.

81.

Id. at 396; see also id. at 361 ("There has been no suggestion that workers' compensation should
be abandoned and replaced by a pure tort system; indeed, this would be counter to trends in other
fields where negligence-based tort recoveries are being replaced, at least in part, by no-fault or
general accident insurance schemes. Nothing in our empirical review would lead us to propose such
a change."). .
See Susan G . Clark, Comment, The National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act: The National Vaccine
Injury Compensation Program, 94 Eo. LAW REP. 67 1 , 676-77 ( 1 994).
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by an excise tax on the sale of the covered vaccines . Manufacturers are
therefore either not liable for damages awarded by the CVCP or, to the .
extent they are, their liability is allocated by market share. 82 The CVCP is
meant to be expeditious (proceedings should not exceed one year),
accessible, and informal . 83 The act imposed on lawyers an "ethical
obligation" to inform their clients about the process and instructs the
Secretary of Health and Human Services to publicize the system.
After the Claims Court rules on a claimant's case, the claimant has a
choice either to accept that award or, within 90 days , to file a tort action.
To discourage tort claims, however, the vaccine statute limits manufacturers'
liability somewhat. First, manufacturers are immunized from liability in tort
for the unavoidable side effects of the vaccine, if the product was properly
prepared and accompanied by warnings, which are presumed to be adequate.
Relatedly , the statute specifically provides that warnings can be made to
physicians, and they need not necessarily be provided to end users-a result
that effectively preempts some state rulings on this question. Finally ,
punitive damages are sharply restricted. 84
The reasons for providing special tort protections to manufacturers of
childhood vaccines were, at least abstractly , similar to the reasons now
offered for providing cigarette manufacturers some tort law protections.
That is, putatively unpredictable, expanding, and administratively costly tort
liability did not provide injured consumers reliable compensation and
threatened the very survival of an industry (or at least certain members of an
industry) that policy makers believed should be protected. 85 Insofar as the

82.

83.

Eliminating inanufacturer liability in fact motivated creation of the CVCP. The program was
enacted in response to a perceived vaccination crisis, in which manufacturers of beneficial products
were pulling their products from U.S. markets to avoid crippling lawsuits. Given vaccines' positive
externalities to the community and the requirement in all states and the District of Columbia that
children be vaccinated, Congress considered it appropriate that the public at large bear the costs.
See Mary Beth Neraas, Comment, The National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act of 1 986: A Solution
to the Vaccine Liability Crisis? 63 WASH. L. REv. 149, I SO-S I ( 1 988).
But see Lisa J. Steel, National Childhood Vaccine Injury Compensation Program: Is This the Best
We Can Dofor Our Children?, 63 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 144, 146 (arguing that the "strict adherence
by the Special Masters and the Department of Health and Human Services to the Vaccine Injury
Table . . . makes it nearly impossible to establish an injury outside that Table. The Compensation
Program under the Act is adversarial and the issues are technical . . . ).
See Randall B . Keiser, Deja Vu All Over Again? The National Childhood Vaccine Injury
Compensation Act of 1 986, 41 Fooo & DRUG L.J. 1 5 ( 1992).
See DEWEES, DUFF & TREBILCOCK, supra note 6S, at 240-4S; Clark, supra note 8 1 , at 674
(describing the dual concerns of inadequate, time-consuming litigation on the part of the plaintiffs,
and possible market elimination of vaccine manufacturers in a world of increasing liability for
unavoidable injuries); see also Neraas, supra note 82, at I S9 (arguing that inconsistent court
decisions regarding manufacturers' duties to warn have created a disincentive for pharmaceuticals
"

84.
SS.
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CVCP protects the industry from tort liability, however, the goal of the

system appears to be purely a compensation goal , not a deterrence goal.
That goal is, we think, understandable in part because some of the basic
deterrence arguments in favor of liability do not clearly apply in the vaccine
context86 and in part because there remains under the CVCP a residual role
87
Very
for tort law to protect against the manufacture of unsafe vaccines .
recent developments suggest that the goal of keeping the vaccine industry
afloat by reducing the threat of tort liability has been met. 88
3. Black Lung Program

Congress established the Black Lung Program in 1969 to provide
benefits to coal miners, and their surviving dependents , who are totally
disabled by or who die from pneumoconiosis (black lung disease) arising
from their employment in or around the nation's coal mines. 89 Initially the
Social Security Administration administered the Black Lung Program, but
s ince 1 978 the Department of Labor has administered virtually all claims . 90
The Deputy Commissioner of the Workers ' Compensation Program reviews
the claims. 91 There are three requirements to receive benefits which the
claimant can establish by advancing rebuttable presumptions : 92 (1) the miner

86.

87.

88.

89.

90.
91.
92.

to continue manufacturing vaccines).
See DEWEES, DUFF & TREBILCOCK, supra note 65, at 240-42; Croley & Hanson, supra note 37, at
87- 88; see also Neraas, supra note 82, at 1 63 (stating that the tort system is not appropriate where
society has enacted a compulsory public health measure "knowingly undertaking the risk that a
small number of children will inevitably suffer severe reactions from the vaccination"); Steel, supra
note 83, at I 52 ("Vaccines cannot be made free from risk of injury but they are necessary for society
to defeat disease.").
See DEWEES, DUFF & TREBILCOCK, supra note 65, at 243 (describing the residual role of tort law in
this context); Keiser, supra note 84, at 68 (explaining that only failure to warn of unavoidable
adverse side effects and failure to provide direct warnings to the ultimate recipient of the vaccine
are preempted by the CVCP, but that all other theories of potential liability remain available to
plaintiffs, including those for defectively designed vaccine products and manufacturing defects).
See Elyse Tanouye, The Vaccine Business Gets a Shot in the Arm, WALL ST. J., Feb. 25, 1998, at
B I (describing why "the vaccine business is heating up, with potentially huge implications for drug
industry profits and public health," including the "changes in product-liability laws").
Title IV of the Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act, Pub. L. No. 91-1 73, 83 Stat. 792 ( 1 969)
(codified as amended at 30 U.S.C. §§ 901-45 (1994)). See generally DEWEES, DUFF & TREBILCOCK,
supra note 65, at 394-95 (describing the Black Lung program as a type of workers' compensation
program).
See FRANK. S. BLOCH, FEDERAL DISABILITY LAW AND PRACTICE 548 ( 1989).
See 20 C.F.R. § 725.351 ( 1 997).
See Barth, supra note 53, at 1 1 5. A miner with pneumoconiosis who is able to establish
employment of I 5 years or more in an underground coal mine and where evidence indicates totally
disabling respiratory or pulmonary impairment, there shall be a rebuttable presumption that the
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must have a total disability arising out of coal mine employment, (2) the total
disability must be due to pneumoconiosis, and (3) the pneumoconiosis must
be the result of coal mine employment. 93 Total disability is defined as the
inability to engage in gainful employment requiring the skills and abilities
comparable to those that a miner uses in coal mine employment. 94 Once the

claimant meets the burden of establishing a presumption, the burden shifts
to the coal mine operator or the Department to rebut the claim. 95 This can

be a difficult burden to meet, however, given the specific lines of argument
that the Labor Department has identified as not being sufficient to defeat the
presumption. For example, the presumption does not shift after a showing
by the defendant that the claimant had other lung conditions , that the
claimant had other respiratory problems before coming to work at the mines,
or that the claimant was exposed to additional dust in another employment
setting . 96
If the burden is not met by the employer, the claimant may receive
income benefits (37 .5 % of the federal Grade GS-2 salary level) , 97 medical
Surviving spouses, divorced
benefits, 98 and reasonable attorney fee'S'.
spouses , children, siblings, parents , and other dependents of the deceased
1
miner may claim benefits after the miner ' s death . 00
The benefits

administered by the Department of Labor are paid by the responsible coal
1 1
mine operator; 0 if there is not a responsible coal mine operator, the federal
1
Black Lung Disability Trust Fund pays the beneficiary. 02 The Fund is
supported by an excise tax on producers of coal for each ton of coal sold. 1 03
The benefits administered by the Social Security Administration are paid out
of the federal government' s general revenues.
If either the claimant or the operator is dissatisfied with the Department' s
decision, an objection must be filed within 3 0 days . 1 04 After another

93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
1 00.
IOI.
1 02.
1 03.
1 04.

miner is totally disabled by pneumoconiosis.
See Mullins Coal Co. v. Director, OWOP, U.S. Dept. of Labor, 484 U.S. 1 35, 1 4 1 ( 1 987); see also
30 U.S.C. § 901 (a) ( 1994).
See 30 U.S.C. § 902(f)(l)(A) (1994); 20 C.F.R. § 7 1 8.204(b) (1997); see generally 20 C.F.R. § 7 1 8
( 1997).
See 20 C.F.R. § 727.203(b) ( 1 997).
See Barth, supra note 53, at 1 1 2.
See 30 U.S.C. § 922 ( 1 994); 20 C.F.R. § 725.520 (1 997).
See 30 U.S.C. § 924(a) ( 1 994).
See 26 U.S.C. § 9501 (d) ( 1 994); 20 C.F.R. § 725.530 (1997).
See 20 C.F.R. § 725.201 ( 1 997).
See 30 U.S.C. § 932(b) ( 1 994).
See 26 U.S.C. § 950 1 (d) ( 1 994); 30 U.S.C. § 934 (1 994).
See 26 U.S.C. § 4 1 2 1 ( 1 994).
See 20 C.F.R. § 725.4 19 (1997).
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Department review, a party can appeal to an administrative law judge to
105
Further appeals are taken to the Benefits .
review findings of fact and law.
Review Board, which was established by the Longshoremen' s and Harbor
106
Workers ' Compensation Act,
and then to the Court of Appeals for the
circuit where they most recently worked and most likely acquired
107
pneumoconiosis.
The history of the Black Lung movement differs somewhat from the
other causation-based compensation programs in that it arose out of a
growing public awareness of (1) the specific dangers surrounding the mining
108 ( )
2 the insufficiency of state workers'
industry and its workers,
compensation programs with respect to injured miners, 109 and (3) gradual
" 1 10
In addition,
medical acceptance of the existence of such "dust diseases.
111
the political leverage gained through a series of "wildcat strikes" in 1 969,
112
as well as the failure of the mine operators to present a unified opposition,
allowed the miners and their advocates to aggressively lobby fo r stringent
safety standards and adequate compensation programs . Despite the initial
legislative focus on safety, most of the battle lines between the operators and
the miners were drawn with regard to the issue of "compensation, " and
subsequently, to the problematic issue of the funding source behind any such
compensatory program. As Senator Byrd's testimony indicates, the primary
concern in drafting was not in deterring operators or allocating responsibility
especially at a time when "overhead costs [were] already very high and at a
time when it [was] difficult for the product [coal] to remain competitive in

1 05.
1 06.
1 07.
I 08.

I 09.
1 10.

1 1 1.
1 1 2.

See 20 C.F.R. § 725.421 ( 1997).
See 33 U.S.C. § 92 1 (b) ( 1994); 20 C.F.R. §§ 725.48 1 ; 801-802.44 ( 1 997).
See 20 C.F.R. §§ 725.482; 802.4 1 0; 802.4 1 1 ( 1 997).
The Farmington disaster, resulting in the death of 1 1 9 miners in West Frankfort, Illinois, exposed
the dangerous, highly risky nature of the coal mining industry and created a charged political
environment ripe for reform. See BARBARA ELLEN SMITH, DIGGING OUR OWN GRAVES: COAL
MINERS AND THE STRUGGLE OVER BLACK LUNG DISEASE 1 01--02 (1 987).
Barth, supra note' 53, at 9.
Smith, supra note I 08, at I 07 ("ff]he research of a few dissenting physicians began to confirm the
longstanding experiential knowledge of those who had lived with and died from black lung
disease.").
Barth, supra note 53, at 1 1 .
Smith, supra note I 08, at 130. There was a split between the older mine operators who feared any
attempts at reform, and the newer, corporately owned operators who acknowledged the reality of
attracting "new miners in a period of economic expansion and tight labor markets." Id. These
operators were more open to reform but "resolved to shape any legislation to their own advantage."
Id. at 1 3 1 .
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Rather, the key concern was " to w ork out some

program whereby these old and disabled miners . . . who have not qualified
under State [workers' compensation] statutes for disability payments, can be
given assistance through some Federal-State program. " 1 14 Consequently, the
designers of the Black Lung program did no t tie funding of the program to
the safety conditions or records of individual employers, and the program
has had virtually no beneficial deterrence effect. 1 1 5

4. Dalkon Shield Claimants Trust (DSCT)

A fourth example of a no-fault, causation-based regime is the r esult, no t

o f legislation, but of priv ate ordering through judicial supervisi on.

The

Dalko n Shield Claimants Trust was created by settlement of tort claims
1
against the manufacturer of the Dalkon Shield intrauterine device. 1 6 The
settlement created a " global peace, " permanently enjoining suits against the
manufacturer (in bankruptcy at the time), its owners and company officials,
its insurer, and do ctors or health care providers who might otherwise have

faced malpractice clai ms. 1 1 7
A $2.3 billion trust was created and
1
administered by fiv e independent trustees appointed by the court. 1 8 The
trustees developed a plan w hereby potential claimants w er e offered one of
three settlement o ptions. 1 1 9

1 13 . See Legislative History of the Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1 969, Pub. L . No.
9 1 - 1 73, at 399; see also Smith, supra note 1 08, at 1 4 1 (explaining that the result of such
compensation legislation was to take "the heat off the industry and put it on agencies and
administrators in Washington D.C.").
1 14. Legislative History of the Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 9 1-1 73,
at 349; see also DEWEES, DUFF & TREBILCOCK, supra note 65, at 394 (''The black lung program was
introduced . . . in response to the lack of state compensation for coal miners disabled by
pneumoconiosis (lung disease arising from dust inhalation)."). Specifically, Senator Byrd strongly
believed that such responsibility was the duty of Congress: "I have felt that if the Federal
Government could provide assistance along this line, without additional cost to the industry, we
would not incur the opposition ofthe industry . . . the Federal Government would be assuming some
responsibility in this area, and I think it should assume such responsibility." Legislative History of
the Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 9 1 - 1 73, at 349.
1 1 5. See W. Kip Viscusi, Structuring an Effective Occupational Disease Policy: Victim Compensation
and Risk Regulation, 2 YALE J. ON R.Eo. 53, 65 ( 1984).
1 16. See Georgene M. Vairo, The Dalkon Shield Claimants Trust: Paradigm Lost (or Found)? 6 1
FORDHAM L . RE V. 6 1 7, 629 ( 1 992).
1 1 7. Id.
1 1 8. Id. at 630.
1 1 9. A court order established a bar date, which established a deadline by which the claimants had to file
their claim for compensation (later permitting disallowed claimants the opportunity to seek
reinstatement). Id. at 627-28.
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Under Option 1 , designed to eliminate as many frivolous and low-value
claims as possible, 120 any claimant who filed an affidavit stating that she had
used and had been injured by (or may have been injured by) the Dalkon
Even those claimants whose
Shield received a payment of $725 . 121
documentation showed a conflict were paid that amount, since the Trust
reasoned it was less expensive to pay this sum than to expend greater costs
to investigate the claim. 122 Option 2 was intended to resolve the majority of

claims and was designed to "provide moderate, standardized payments to
individuals with relatively mild injuries. " 123 Under this option, the claimant
was required to allege one or more specific, scheduled injuries (such as
pelvic inflammatory disease) and to answer questions under oath regarding
4
use of the device. 12 In addition, the claimant was required to offer medical
records (or an affidavit from a health care provider) documenting her use of
the device and her injury. 125 "Payments available under Option 2 range from
$400 for a loss of consortium claim by the spouse of a Dalkon Shield user
to $5,500 for a user who had certain conditions . . . that resulted in
nonvoluntary sterilizing surgery . " 126

Finally, claimants who did not resolve their claims under Options 1 or
2 could proceed under Option 3, under which specially trained employees

of the trust would review the medical evidence according to a "highly
structured, rules-based process. " 127 Claimants would then be offered the
trust's "best and final offer" based on projected settlement value, a valuation
that is supposed to ignore whether the claimant was represented or had filed
a lawsuit prior to the settlement. 128 If the claimant rejected the offer, the
parties would meet to discuss it, with legal counsel permitted to be present, 129
although the trust would not increase the offer without new evidence. 1 30

1 20. Id.
1 2 1 . id. at 633. Kenneth R. Feinberg, The Da/kon Shield Claimant 's Trust, 53 LAW & CONTEMP PROBS.
79, I 06 ( 1 990). The payment would be even smaller if the claimant alleged only a derivative
injury-that is, that the injury (e.g., loss of consortium) was the result of another person's use of the
device. Id. Roughly 40% of all active claims have been resolved through Option I . Id.
1 22. Feinberg, supra note 1 2 1 , at 1 06.
1 23. Id. at 1 07.
1 24. Id. at 1 06.
1 25. Id.
126. Id. at 1 07.
1 27. Vairo, supra note 1 1 6, at 64 1 .
128. Id.
1 29. Feinberg, supra note 1 2 1 , at 1 08.
1 30. See Vairo, supra note 1 1 6, at 642-43.
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Only after this conference could the claimant litigate or go to binding
arbitration. 1 3 1

As in the other causation-based models, claims are brought to the DSCT
by injured parties . The DSCT differs from the other models, however, in
that the party paying the awards is also assessing the claims . This system
relies on independent trustees and court supervision to ensure the DSCT's
fairness. It also offers more extensive damage awards , as costs are not
limited to economic harms but also include pain and suffering . The system
is designed, with its multi-level, non-adversarial structure, to discourage
litigation. At the same time, the DSCT's assessment of claims takes place
in the shadow of tort law, since any offer may be foregone in favor of
binding arbitration or a. lawsuit. The evidentiary standards employed,
therefore, mirror those in tort law, as the DSCT is estimating the value of a
claimant's case in tort. 1 32 Since the DSCT grew out of litigation against one
defendant company, questions of allocation are not present in this context.
The trust was funded by the defendant under consent decree. 1 33
5. Summary

The " real world" models of causation-based compensation programs
described in the prior section indicate that institutional systems of
compensation for injury are neither ideologically foreign nor politically
infeasible. Workers ' Compensation, though undergoing frequent reforms ,
has been and will continue to remain an important fixture in the realm of
employer-employee relations. The historical forces underlying the Black
Lung movement may have been idiosyncratic to the particular era and
occupation, but the legislative success of a no-fault compensation system for
inj�red miners in the face of medical agnosticism, diagnostic difficulties, and

1 3 1 . Id. at 644.
1 32. The Trust's policy, however, is to rely on its own valuation of the claim-even after the claimant
independently obtains a jury verdict or arbitration award-to discourage claimants from litigating.
The Trust pays only the amount of its own settlement offer, and "holds back" the balance until it
is clear that sufficient funds exist to pay all valid, non-subordinated claims. See id. at 643. In those
ways, according to Professor Sobol, the Trust is similar to workers' compensation, with fixed
amounts for injuries, limited proof requirements, and discouragement of litigation. See RICHARD
B. SOBOL, BENDING THE LAW: THE STORY OF THE DALKON SHIELD BANKRUPTCY 3 1 5-16 ( 1 991 ).
1 33 . It bears noting that a variety of causation-based, less-than-full-damages compensation plans have
been adopted in other countries to cover a variety of injury contexts. For instance, drug injury
compensation schemes are in place in Japan, Germany, and Sweden, all of which exclude coverage
for pain-and-suffering losses. For a brief description of those programs, see DEWEES, DUFF &
TREBILCOCK, supra note 65, at 243-44. For a fuller discussion and assessment of those programs,
see John G. Fleming, Drug Injury Compensation Plans, 30 AMER. J. COMP. L. 297 ( 1 982).
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a growing worry over unwieldy levels of filings , shows that the possibility
of alternative compensation is not rendered moot by such difficulties. And
while the Dalkon Shield Trust and the Childhood Vaccination program may
differ from our proposed system in that the former involved a trust set up in
bankruptcy against one specific responsible party and the latter was
conceived of as a purely compensatory scheme, their administrative systems
and standards for claimants reveal the viability of an analogous, carefully
molded system designed to compensate another class of injured consumers
today-smokers .
C . Proposed Causation-Based Systems for Tobacco-Related Harms
The idea of an causation-based compensation system specifically for
smoking-related injuries is not new. Over twenty years ago, Donald Gamer
proposed a system in which welfare agencies could bring no-fault claims
against cigarette manufacturers to recover direct medical costs and related
transfer payments, such as social security disability payments. 1 34 These
claims could be brought before a special tribunal established solely for the
purpose and staffed with expert factfinders to manage any complicated
scientific questions of causation. 1 35 In effect, Gamer's proposal allowed only

subrogated claims, as individuals were not eligible to participate. Claimants
could invoke a rebuttable presumption of causation, if they could
demonstrate that the victim had smoked for the designated period of time . 1 36
If the presumptions were not rebutted, liability would be apportioned among
manufacturers according to the approximate number of each manufacturer's
cigarettes that the victim smoked. In addition, there would be a presumption
that all cigarettes are equally dangerous, a presumption that would be
rebuttable by a manufacturer's showing that its brand is safer than the
others. 1 37
Since Gamer's article , legal scholars have continued to explore the
notion of a causation-based compensation scheme for tobacco-related
injuries. Richard Ausness, for example, proposed creating an administrative

1 34. Donald W. Gamer, Cigarettes and Welfare Reform, 26 EMORY L.J. 269, 3 1 4 ( 1977). Even a cursory
read of Professor Gamer's article will reveal numerous similarities between his proposals and those
discussed in this Article. Although we discovered his work relatively late in our thinking on this
topic, we are indebted to him for his groundbreaking work in this area.
135. Id. at 3 19. He suggests the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals and the Patent Office Board of
Appeals as possible models. Id.
1 36. Id. at 3 1 5 .
1 37. Id. at 3 1 6- 1 7 .
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board with rulemaking and adjudicative authority to process tobacco-injury
claims. 1 38
As under Garner's system, Ausness' s board would set
presumptions of causation, presumptions that might even be irrebuttable for
certain diseases; and damages would be limited to economic losses. 1 39 Most
recently, Paul Lebel advocated a system that would minimize administrative

costs by incorporating broad, categorical determinations of causation and
4
damages . 1 0 Lebel' s program would be open only to individuals with
4
particular diseases and smoking patterns , 1 1 and those individuals would be.
allowed to collect only out-of-pocket medical expenses. 1 42 Lebel would also

allow a modest benefit to families of smokers who die from smoking-related
diseases, primarily for the symbolic value. 1 43 Both Ausness and Lebel would
finance the payment of damages through an excise tax. 144
Those earlier proposals were not designed to address all of the
deterrence and cost-internalization goals that, in our view, should be
central. 1 45 The Ausness-Lebel excise tax for instance, would impose costs
of harm on all manufacturers, irrespective of their causal connection. As we
have emphasized above, however, the goal of optimal deterrence requires

that each manufacturer bears that portion of the overall cigarette-caused
harm that is attributable to that manufacturer 's brands. Only then will
market forces lead manufacturers to design, produce, and market safer
cigarettes. And only then will each brand of cigarette fully reflect its
expected costs, thus leading to optimal activity levels.
Although none of the actual or proposed causation-based compensation

systems provide a perfect model for a Smokers' Compensation system, they
usefully highlight some of the major considerations and trade-offs in
designing the ideal Smokers' Compensation system. We can draw on these

1 38. Richard C. Ausness, Compensation/or Smoking-Related Injuries: An Alternative to Strict Liability
in Tort, 36 WAYNE L. RE V. 1 085, 1 124-25 ( 1 990).
1 39. Id. at 1 127-29.
1 40. Paul A. Lebel, Beginning the Endgame: The Searchfor an Injury Compensation System Alternative
to Tort Liabilityfor Tobacco Related Harms, 24 N. KY. L. RE V. 457, 474 ( 1 997).
1 4 1 . Id. at 490.
1 42. Id. at 492.
1 43. Id.
144. Ausness, supra note 1 38, at 1 1 24-25; Lebel, supra note 140, at 493.
1 45. Alternative compensation systems generally have been proposed to serve insurance, administrative
efficiency, and corrective justice goals. See, e.g., Ausness, supra note 1 38, at 1 088; Rabin, supra
note 53, at 95 I . Lebel's and Gamer's proposals are based in part on a cost-internalization premise
to enhance safety. See Gamer, supra note 1 34, at 277 (goals are removing government subsidies
of tobacco and encouraging safety); Lebel, supra note 140, at 466 (goals are compensation,
enhancing safety, administrative efficiency, and cost-internalization). Ausness's goal is corrective
justice and administrative efficiency. Id. at 1 125 n. 1 78.
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models as we attempt to meet the deterrence and incentive goals on which
Smokers' Compensation is predicated while accommodating limitations
imposed by technical impossibilities and political compromise. 146
IV . TOWARD A BLUEPRINT
If Congress

were

seriously

to

consider adopting

a

Smokers'

Compensation scheme, we would recommend that it begin by appointing
some sort of special commission or panel to consider carefully the feasibility

of the wide range of options available to it. The panel should comprise
public health experts, epidemiologists, physicians, economists, lawyers, and
the like, all of whom should have relevant expertise and an understanding of
the goals of a Smokers ' Compensation system . The panel would be asked
to provide detailed answers to the sorts of questions we touch on in this
Article and to assess whether, overall, the game would be worth the
candle . 1 47 The role of this panel might be roughly similar to that of the
trustees of the Dalkon Shield Claimants ' Trust, who were charged with
establishing procedures for disbursing the trust to claimants . 1 48 We see our
discussion in this section as simply a possible starting point for the analysis
that such a panel would need to conduct.
A. Who Decides?
As the models discussed above demonstrate, there are a variety of
possible decision-making frameworks available. The choice i:nay turn in
significant part on how much expertise the decision maker or decision
making board must have . Just as judges on the Tax Court are typically
experts in the tax field, the Smokers' Compensation board or administrative
law judges might be drawn from experts fluent in the language of scientific
and epidemiological evidence. Alternatively, there may be some advantage
to mimicking the Vaccine Program by relying on federal courts to implement
the program . Federal courts, although not specialists in epidemiology, are
already in place and may be relieved of the threat of. many costly tobacco-

146. Procedural questions may loom large as well. For example, one threshold question is whether a
Smokers' Compensation system would partially or fully preempt tort law.
1 47. For reasons that we discuss below, there may also be a significant role for such a panel once the
Smokers' C�mpensation system were up and running.
1 48. See supra notes 1 1 8-19 and accompanying text.
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related lawsuits were a Smokers' Compensation system implemented. 1 49 On
the other hand, a potential flood of claims could overwhelm the federal
judiciary, suggesting the need for an independent adjudicatory apparatus
along the lines of the workers' compensation systems .
B . What Losses Are Covered?
1 . Current Practices in Other Causation-Based Compensation Systems

As indicated above, the measure of damages in all causation-based
compensation schemes differ significantly from that in tort. Tort law
provides individualized damages, which include full recovery for medical
expenses and lost earnings and allow for limitless amounts of pain-and- ·
suffering compensation. 150 In contrast, as we describe in this subsection,

causation-based compensation systems usually· provide compensation for
economic losses only 1 5 1 and partial compensation at that.

a. Medical Expenses
Causation-based compensation systems usually are most generous with
respect to medical losses. State workers' compensation laws provide for
unlimited medical treatment, both in terms of cost and duration, 152 although
some states put doctors' fees on a schedule . 153 Similarly, the federal

government allows full recovery of all medical expenses for individuals
covered by the Federal Employees' Compensation Act and the Longshore
Act, 154 the Black Lung progrdz\1 ,
and the National Vaccine Injury
156
The Dalkon Shield Claimants' Trust takes a
Compensation Program.

1 49. Also, if the federal judiciary were used, they could be specifically empowered, if necessary, to call
on the help of scientific experts. See infra notes 274-76.
1 50. In recent years many states have enacted statutes capping pain-and-suffering damages in tort. See
ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS 458-59 ( 1 988); Richard B. Schmitt, While
Congress Debates, States limit Civil lawsuits, WALL ST. J., June 1 6, 1995, at B l .
1 5 1 . Efficiency minded scholars typically characterize easily quantified losses, such as medical costs as
economic. But see Croley & Hanson, supra note 37, at 1 857-61 (arguing that medical losses are
more accurately characterized as nonpecuniary losses).
1 52. U.S. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, supra note 52, at 32-33.
1 53 . Id. at 34.
1 54. Id. at 33.
1 55. 20 C.F.R. § 725.70l(b) ( 1 997).
1 56. 42 U.S.C.A. 300aa-l 5 ( 1 997). Drug compensation programs in other countries also limit damages
in this way. See supra note 1 33 .
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different approach (at least in Option 2, by which most claims are settled), 1 57
providing claimants with scheduled damage awards for particular injuries.
The DSCT awards thus are based not on actual medical expenditures of
given claimants, but an average award appropriate to the claimant's
circumstances.
b. Disability

Causation-based compensation schemes are considerably less generous
with respect to lost wages, since full compensation for lost wages might
eliminate an injured worker's financial incentive to return to work. 1 58 To
accommodate this practical difficulty, in compensating for full disability
(either temporary or permanent), all state and federal workers' compensation
systems calculate lost wages at a percentage of pre-injury earnings, usually
66-2/3 3 . 1 59 In addition, all of those programs have maximum benefits,
usually a percentage of the average state weekly wage (ranging from
66-2/3 3 to 1503 ), and most have minimums. 160
This workers'
compensation method for calculating compensable lost wages seems well
accepted. For example, Professor Rabin, in proposing a mass toxics
compensation system, endorsed a two-thirds-of-wages award with an indexed
ceiling. 161
Lost wages resulting from permanent partial disabilities-the loss of a
body part or hearing-are generally compensated separately from temporary
full disability. 162 If a worker loses an arm, for example, he receives
temporary full disability compensation while in convalescence, then lifetime

1 57. See supra note 1 23 and accompanying text.
1 58. This moral hazard problem is less pronounced with respect to medical expenses, because the injured
person usually has non-economic incentives to avoid needless medical procedures expenses. Also,
despite the real differences in economic impact of missing work based on wage levels, some find
it inequitable that individuals suffering the same injury receive different levels of compensation.
Richard Ausness makes such an argument in advocating for uniform schedules of compensation for
tobacco-related injuries. Ausness, supra note 1 38, at 1 1 29. And David Rosenberg earlier made
such an argument against income-varied damages in mass exposure tort cases. See Rosenberg,
supra note 36, at 9 1 8.
1 59. See U.S. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, supra note 52, at 22-25. Note that disability payments from
workers' compensation programs are not taxed, so the benefits "replace approximately 90% of net
wages lost for about 80% of workers who file claims." DEWEES, DUFF & TREBILCOCK, supra note
65, at 392.
1 60. See U.S. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, supra note 52, at 22-25.
1 6 1 . Rabin, supra note 53, at 97 1 .
1 62. See U.S. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, supra note 52, at 27. Five states deduct the compensation for
temporary full disability from the compensation for permanent partial disability. Four others cap
the compensation allowed for temporary full disability. Id.
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permanent partial disability compensation.
The permanent partial
compensation is usually awarded according to a schedule and is not based on
wage levels or estimated future wage loss. 163
c. Death Bene.fits

While death does produce an economic loss, the nature of the loss is
nevertheless somewhat different from the economic losses discussed above,
inasmuch as that economic loss is borne not by the decedent but by the
decedent's survivors. Most state workers' compensation systems provide
death benefits to the spouse or dependent children of the decedent in an
amount equal to compensation for total disability, plus a payment for burial
expenses. 164 Because this compensation is supposed to replace the wages that
would have been earned by the decedent, many states phase them out if the
surviving spouse remarries. ' 65 The National Vaccine program pays a flat
award of $250,000 in the event of death, 166 an approach that Professor Lebel
advocates. 1 67
d. Noneconomic Losses

Workers' compensation and other alternative causation-based
compensation systems are often said not to compensate injured parties for
non-economic losses. Indeed, that limit on damages may be the most
significant difference between administrative alternatives and tort law, where
damages for pain and suffering are generally available, often for amounts
exceeding economic damages. The difference may be slightly overstated,
however, for there are ways in which causation-based schemes can be seen
to provide de facto compensation for nonpecuniary losses. For example,
scheduled permanent partial disability compensation payments under
workers' compensation are paid to any claimant who fits the description.
Those payments, ostensibly to compensate for wage loss, are made
irrespective of the claimant's financial situation. As a consequence,
claimants who suffer no wage loss may still receive compensation, making

1 63.
1 64.
165.
1 66.
1 67.

Eight states base compensation on the degree of impairment. Id.
Id. at29.
Id. at 29-30.
42 U.S.C.A. § 300aa-1 5(a)(2) ( 1 997).
Lebel, supra note 1 40, at 492. The only death benefits provided under the Dalkon Shield plan
appear to be for infant deaths, which may be compensated in a fixed amount under Option 2 in the
amount of$3,200. See Feinberg, supra note 1 2 1 , at 1 07; Sobol, supra note 1 32, at 3 13 .
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the scheduled payments in those circumstances look more like compensation
for intangible losses associated with permanent partial disability than for loss
of wages . 168 One compensation program, the National Vaccine Injury
Compensation Program, does allow claimants to receive up to $250,000 for
intangible (pain and suffering) damages at the discretion of the factfinder.1 69
2.

The Case for Limiting Smokers ' Compensation Awards to Economic
Damages

In this section we argue that, given the policy goals and political
constraints discussed above, a Smokers' Compensation system should, like
most of the current cause-based systems, award only economic damages.
More specifically, the Smokers' Compensation should provide, as do most
workers' compensation programs, complete, though perhaps scheduled,
medical benefits, 170 partial but substantial disability benefits, and death
benefits. Compensation for noneconomic losses, if any, should be scheduled
and modest.
The case is strong for treating the other causation-based compensation
schemes as precedents worthy of emulation. First, by mirroring a workers'
compensation system, a Smokers' Compensation system would make the
tobacco industry subject to a type of regulation that would be perceived as
neither too draconian nor too lenient. Put slightly different, the industry
1 68. Cf Patricia M. Danzon, Tort Reform andthe Role ofGovernment in Private Insurance Markets, 1 3
J. LEGAL STUD. 5 1 7, 524 ( 1984) (stating that lump-sum benefits o fthis sort bear "some resemblance
to compensation for pain and suffering"). A number of jurisdictions, mostly in Canada, now
explicitly recognize and compensate the non-economic harm suffered by permanent partial
disability. Saskatchewan and Florida led the way, instituting dual track compensation for such
disabilities under which they pay physical impairment benefits and lower lost wage benefits than
they previously had. PAUL c. WEILER, PERMANENT PARTIAL DISABILITY: ALTERNATIVE MODELS FOR
COMPENSATION 3 (report submitted to the Minister of Labour, Province of Ontario, 1986). New
Brunswick, Newfoundland, and Quebec later adopted similar provisions. Id. at 4. Advocates argue
that the significant effect on the victim's life outside the workplace ought to be compensated, even
if it is non-economic. Id. at 3 .
1 69. 4 2 U.S.C.A. § 300aa- 1 5(a)(4) (1997).
1 70. A more open question is whether monitoring costs prior to manifestation of disease ought to be
covered. To the extent a smoker legitimately incurs additional expense in anticipation of smoking
related diseases, those costs are caused by cigarettes. Rabin would want to cover the monitoring
expenses in his proposed system, although he acknowledges that the pragmatic difficulties given
a large universe of the potentially injured (all exposed to the toxin) might make reimbursement of
these expenses politically unacceptable. See Rabin, supra note 53, at 973; see also David
Rosenberg, Individual Justice and Collectivizing Risk-Based Claims in Mass-Exposure Cases, 7 1
N.Y.U. L . REv. 2 1 0, 220 n.22 ( 1 996) (listing a number o f lawsuits i n which plaintiffs have sought
to recover medical monitoring costs); id. at 234-35 (discussing whether and when medical
monitoring or mitigation claims are necessary).
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would be subject to the very same sort of regulation to which other
industries, seeking tort law protection, have been subject. Second, by
deferring somewhat to precedent, the Federal government would be sending
a clearer deterrence signal that would go well beyond the tobacco industry. 171
The case is made considerably stronger when one recognizes that
commonly made arguments against holding cigarette manufacturers liable in
tort would lose most of their force if damages were limited as we have
described. 172 One major critique of the tort system is that it is far too slow
and expensive to adminjster and that it subjects manufacturers to liability for
unpredictable and lottery-like damage awards. The Proposed Resolution, for
example, emphasizes these themes, calling the civil actions now pending
"complex, slow-moving, expensive and burdensome, " and claiming that
" [o]nly national legislation offers the prospect of a swift, fair, equitable and
consistent result. " 173 The Proposed Resolution purportedly reflects the "need
to avoid the cost, expense, uncertainty and inconsistency associated with [the
current] protracted litigation. " 174 Presumably, much of the perceived
problem stems from the fact that tort damages include pain-and-suffering
damages and the assumptions that those damages can be costly to prove and
calculate and tend to be more variable and unpredictable than economic
damages. Clearly, one benefit of a Smokers' Compensation scheme is that
it would be administratively cheaper and significantly more predictable and
consistent than civil litigation, especially if liability is limited to just
economic damages. 175
It may be worth noting that scholars and

1 7 1 . See generally Hanson & Logue, supra note 3, at 1302--04 (describing the potential general
deterrence benefits of such government policies).
1 72. We want to be very clear here that we believe that most of the arguments against holding tobacco
manufacturers liable are either wrong or vastly overstated. In this section, we will focus on only one
type of counterargument-that is, again, showing how many ofthe anti-liability arguments are at least
partially contingent upon an assumption that liability would be for both economic and noneconomic
damages.
1 73 . Proposed Resolution, supra note 4, at 4.
1 74. Id. There is considerable irony to this critique of tort liability in light of the facts that the liability
costs of tobacco manufacturers had, at least prior to the proposed settlement, long been consistently
low and that the gargantuan administrative costs of litigating a cigarette claim has always been
disproportionately attributable to the tobacco industry's spare-no-expense legal strategies. Another
difficulty with the critique it that manufacturers of virtually every other product in our economy
have all been subject to the tort system, notwithstanding those putative problems, and providing
special tort immunity to cigarette manufacturers on those grounds is hard to justify.
1 75. This is true in large part because there is no need to measure the very difficult-to-measure pain-and
suffering damages as is done in the majority of tort cases. On the other hand, the costs of
measuring pain-and-suffering damages might be reduced through the use of some sort of injury
specific grid or schedule of damages for nonpecuniary losses associated with different sorts of
smoking-related illnesses. For a description of a system in which pain-and-suffering damages were
averaged and scheduled, see David Rosenberg, Scheduling in Mass Exposure Cases, I COURTS,
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commentators have rarely complained about the costs of making damages
calculations in workers' compensation proceedings. 1 76
Of course,
administrative costs might be lowered further by, for example, awarding
non-individualized economic damages according to injury type. 177
Limiting compensation to economic damages would also address the
objections of critics of cigarette-manufacturer liability who believe that
expanded liability and compensation would have adverse incentive effects on
consumers. For instance, some commentators assert that a system that
compensates smokers for smoking-related injuries would remove from
smokers much of the responsibility for their own actions. 178 The concern,
which we do not share, 179 seems to be that the promise of compensation will

1 76.

1 77.

1 78.
1 79.

HEALTH Ser. & L. 335 ( 1 99 1 ). As we argue below, however, there may be several reasons for not
awarding nonpecuniary losses even if they were easily measured. Many efficiency-oriented scholars
have argued that nonpecuniary-loss damages are undesirable because they force consumers to
purchase a type of insurance that they do not demand. Some of those scholars have concluded that
the pain-and-suffering component of tort damages or no-fault compensation should therefore be
lowered if not eliminated. See, e.g., DEWEES, DUFF & TREBILCOCK, supra note 65, at 393. See
generally Croley & Hanson, Nonpecuniary Costs, supra note 37 (reviewing and then criticizing the
conventional economic wisdom on pain-and-suffering damages).
Limiting damages in this way may reduce administrative costs further by encouraging collectivized
subrogation claims instead of individualized direct claims. Scholars have begun to take seriously
the possibility that insurers would use subrogation rights more often in personal injury contexts and
to identify the potential benefits of this sort of arrangement. See generally Croley & Hanson,
Nonpecuniary Costs, supra note 37, at 1 8 12, 1 867-71 (describing the role the subrogation rights
currently play and the role that they could play in tort cases). See, e.g., David Rosenberg, Of End
Games and Openings in Mass Tort Cases: lessons from a Special Master, 69 B.U. L. REv. 695,
729-30 (1 989) (describing some of the benefits including "that the insurer could efficiently
aggregate claims dispersed over time and territory as well as the capital necessary to fund adequate
presentation of the case. Agency problems between class members and their counsel would also be
eliminated by transferring ownership of claims to the insurer"); David Rosenberg, The Uncertainties
ofAssigned Shares Tort Compensation: What We Pon 't Know Can Hurt Us, 6 RISK ANALYSIS 363
( 1986) (making similar observations); Joseph B. Treaster, State Farm Lawsuit Says Ford Hid Risk
ofFire in Vehicles, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 2 1 , 1998, at A l (describing an actual case in which insurer is
suing defendant on behalfofall of its insureds); cf Robert Cooter, Towards a Market in Unmatured
Tort Claims, 75 VA. L. REv. 383 ( 1989) (making a case for allowing a market in unmatured tort
claims, which is, in essence, a case for allowing insurers to exercise subrogation rights for the full
value of tort claims).
See infra notes 1 88-94 and accompanying text. Many workers' compensation programs provide
a schedule of benefits for certain injuries. For instance, if a worker loses sight in one eye in a work
related injury, then the worker might receive a pre-specified amount, even if the partial blindness
does not create any disability. DAN B. DOBBS, TORTS AND COMPENSATION: PERSONAL
ACCOUNTABILITY AND SOCIAL REsPONSIBILITY FOR INJURY 873-74 (2d ed. 1993). There may be
another sort of administrative-cost benefit of limiting damages. That is, because other causation
based systems limit damages, it would be simpler for policymakers to do the same so that they can
mimic and learn from the programs already in existence.
See infra notes 299-303 and accompanying text; Hanson & Logue, supra note 3, at 1 350.
See Hanson & Logue, supra note 3, at 1 1 8 1-1262.
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give rise to what economists call "moral hazard"-that is, smokers would
engage in greater quantities of risky activity than they would were they
required to pay for all of the costs of their decisions. On the other hand,
other commentators claim that just the opposite would occur. Their
argument seems to be that because smokers are already aware of the risks
and already take those risks into account when purchasing each pack of
cigarettes; forcing smokers to pay a higher price for cigarettes that itself
reflects the risks of smoking, will overdeter consumers from smoking.
Smokers will internalize the risks once when deciding to buy another pack
of cigarettes and then again when purchasing the pack at the increased
price. ISO
We have argued elsewhere that neither the under deterrence argument
nor the overdeterrence argument poses as significant a problem as scholars
have suggested. 1s1 But the point that we want to make here is that, even if
we accept the basic premises of the two arguments, ex post compensation
will create neither an under deterrence problem nor an overdeterrence
problem as long as damages are limited to economic damages. There are
two reasons under deterrence is not a problem. First, where only economic
damages are paid, the threat of noneconomic damages will more clearly
encourage smokers to take appropriate precautions. 1 82 Second, even if there
is some residual moral hazard problem, that problem would exist under the
current regime anyway, inasmuch as many smoking-related losses are
already covered by some sort of insurance. 1s3
Thus, a Smokers'

1 80. See id. at 1 232-36.
1 8 1 . One major flaw in each argument can be easily glimpsed by placing the arguments side-by-side as
we �ave here: each incentive effect offsets the other. That is, if consumers were required to pay in
the price of the cigarettes that they purchase a de facto insurance premium for coverage against
cigarette-caused harms, then they would not escape responsibility for their decisions to smoke. See
id. at 1 279-80, 1 3 50-5 1 . Similarly, insofar as consumers are compensated ex post for smoking
caused harms, they will not be overdeterred. For a fuller treatment of this argument, see id. at
1 274-78.
1 82. Cf Hanson & Logue, Insurance Externa/ity, supra note 37, at 1 87 (explaining that the threat of.
nonpecuniary losses will help ensure that consumers take care, even where nonpecuniary-loss
damages are awarded). Ausness, supra note 1 38, at 1 129 (suggesting that disallowing
nonpecuniary-loss damages may be an appropriate way of acknowledging some responsibility on
the part of smokers).
1 83. See Hanson & Logue, Insurance Externa/ity, supra note 37, at 1 72-73; see also Robert L. Rabin,
No-Fault Compensation for Tobacco-Related Disease, Remarks at the Conference on the So-Called
Global Tobacco Settlement 16, Univ. of Wisconsin Law School (Oct. 1 6, 1997) (transcript on file
with authors). Even if injured smokers were entitled to compensation for all pecuniary and
nonpecuniary losses, the ex ante moral hazard problem would not be very significant. Smokers
would have to pay for the insurance with each pack of cigarette purchased and there may be little
in the way of care-level precautions that consumers can take (or fail to take). See Hanson & Logue,
supra note 3, at 1280.
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Compensation program would not create a problem, at worst it would

reproduce it.
Similarly, limiting damages to economic losses would, again for two
reasons, largely overcome any overdeterrence problem. First, insofar as
consumers anticipate that a Smokers' Compensation system would
compensate for smoking-caused economic harms, the overdeterrence
problem goes away. 1 84 Second, smokers would understand that the additional
part of the price would reflect not a loss, but a de facto first-party insurance
premium. That is, the assumption that consumers are well informed with
respect to the economic risks is not relevant inasmuch as smokers are able
to externalize those risks to those who finance public and private insurance
arrangements that typically end up paying for the bulk of smoking-caused
economic costs. Thus, a Smokers' Compensation program would not create
an overdeterrence problem because consumer information with respect to
those risks does not affect consumer behavior even under the current regime.
There are several other potentially significant benefits of limiting
liability to economic damages, or perhaps even to just a portion of economic
damages . For instance, while the economic damages may be substantial, 185
they may not be so significant as to bankrupt the entire industry . 186

Relatedly, they will also be less likely to stimulate a robust black market in
cigarettes. 1 87
The administrative cost savings of limiting compensation to economic
damages could be dramatically increased if even economic damages were
scheduled. Just as workers' compensation systems establish grids by which
victims of permanent partial disabilities receive pre-determined amounts, 188
Smokers' Compensation could base damages on the average cost of a given
injury or combination of injuries . Thus, if the average cost of treating, for
example, a middle-aged, female victim of laryngeal cancer 189 is $100, any
such claimant would receive $100, even if her actual expenditures were $50
or $150. If the schedule is set accurately to the average treatment costs, the
lack of individualized damages may not affect deterrence. 190 Although in any

See Hanson & Logue, supra note 3, at 1 274-78.
See infra notes 292-98 and accompanying text [Bankruptcy Concerns section].
See Hanson & Logue, supra note 3, at 1 305 & n.579. Cf Ausness, supra note 1 38, at 1 129.
For a discussion of whether and to what extent the black-market problem would be exacerbated by
an ex post incentive-based form of cigarette regulation, see Hanson & Logue, supra note 3, at
1298- 1 3 0 1 .
1 88. See supra notes 1 62-63 and accompanying text.
1 89. Depending on the variation in treatment costs across demographic boundaries, it might be advisable
to create a greater or fewer number of categorical distinctions.
190. See supra note 36.
1 84.
1 85.
1 86.
1 87.
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given case, manufacturers may be paying more than or less than actual

damages, in aggregate, they would pay the same amount for the laryngeal
cancer cases they caused as they would if each victim were paid actual
costs . 191
Perhaps counterintuitively, for several reasons, scheduled damages may
well be preferred by claimaints purely on compensation grounds-even by
those claimaints who experience above-average losses. First, as David
Rosenberg has emphasized, removing the burden of proving the value of

one's loss could more than offset the difference between what high-damages
claimants would receive in an individualized system and the statistical
average they would receive under a scheduled system. 192 So, returning to the
previous example, if the costs of demonstrating damages is more than $50,
even a high-damage claimaint is better off receiving the average $ 100.
Moreover, that a schedule would provide averaged, rather than
individualized, compensation would not be a problem from the perspective
of most likely claimants under a Smokers' Compensation system-that is,
private and public insurers . Because of the law of large numbers, total
insurance pay-outs should approximate averaged damages (e . g . , $100 per
insurance pay-out) , which is precisely what a scheduled system would

compensate them. Furthermore , as Bruce Hay and David Rosenberg have
argued, even individual claimants may, at least from an ex ante perspective,
prefer a regime that provides averaged rather than individualized
compensation. 193 They write:
For the prospective [claimant] who does not know the quality his case will
have, an averaging system offers the same expected recovery as an
individualizing system.

If he were concerned only with the expected

recovery . . . , therefore, he would simply be indifferent between the two
systems.

Averaging, however, tends to reduce both the expense and the

1 9 1 . If treatment costs of diseases caused by different cigarettes were not consistent-if, for example,
certain brands caused a particularly virulent form of cancer that systematically cost more to treat
than the treatment costs of cancer caused by other brands-then averaging damages may partially
undermine the goals of Smokers' Compensation. Assume that Brand X caused an especially
ferocious cancer while Brand Y caused the same disease, but a less intractable version. Although
claimants that smoked either brand would collect the average cost, Brand X's customers would
actually account for more of those costs than Brand Y. Thus the manufacturer of Brand X would
be underdeterred while the manufacturer of Brand Y would be overdeterred. To put the point more
broadly, a damages schedule will need to be accurate (and frequently updated) in terms of how
diseases are categorized and in terms of the compensation levels allowed for each category.
1 92. See David Rosenberg, Class Actionsfor Mass Torts: Doing Individual Justice by Collective Means,
62 IND. L.J 561 , 572-73 ( 1 987).
1 93 . See generally Bruce L. Hay & David Rosenberg, The Individual Justice of Averaging (unpublished
manuscript on file with authors).
.
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riskiness associated with [bringing a claim], and for these reasons will often
be strictly preferable to individualization in the eyes of the prospective
[claimant] .

The only way to realize the benefits is to make averaging

compulsory, because ex post-once [claimants] know the quality of their
case-they will have an incentive to avoid averaging. Yet transaction costs
frequently prevent [claimants] from agreeing, ex ante, to a regime of
compulsory averaging.

Hence the argument for compulsory averaging

imposed by the legal system. 1 94

In sum, were a Smokers' Compensation program to mandate averaging of
compensation through a scheduling approach, not only would administrative
costs be reduced but also potential claimants may be made better off. 1 95
In the Smokers' Compensation context, scheduling damages would mean
that claimants would have to prove only the existence of their injury as well
as causation. As we will discuss more fully below, there are options for
collectivizing the causation inquiry through such mechanisms as evidentiary
presumptions and proportional liability. 1 96 In tandem, these devices could
conceivably streamline the claim procedure to a point where claims may be

filed by mail without sacrificing the deterrence objectives of Smokers'
Compensation. 1 97

1 94. Id. at 2 (footnote omitted). They conclude that everything should be averaged-including elements
such as causation-except as deterrence or marginal-utility-of-wealth considerations otherwise
require. See id. at Part IV.B.2. David Rosenberg is ofthe opinion that we may have, in light of the
Hay and Rosenberg analysis, erred in favor of recommending more individualization (and less
averaging) than is appropriate given the goal of detterence. See Memo from David Rosenberg
(March 1 9, 1 998) (on file with authors). We are inclined to disagree, but, if wrong, we would
happily embrace the conclusion that a Smokers' Compensation system could be made even less
costly to administer than we have described.
1 95. Additional benefits of scheduling damages are that the increased predictability of such a system is
likely to make Smokers' Compensation more attractive to manufacturers, and scheduled damages
would encourage claimants to bring claims early in the disease cycle. Whereas in an individualized
system a claimant might have an incentive to let costs mount before bringing claims, a scheduled
award would create an incentive to bring claims as soon as possible. To the extent that accelerated
claims lead to more preventative care, the total costs of treatment are likely to shrink. Moreover,
accelerated claims mean less time between manufacture and liability, perhaps enhancing the
deterrence effect. Finally reducing the length of time between smoking and claim might ease certain
factual inquiries, such as which brands were smoked and for how long.
196. See infra notes 222-34 and accompanying text.
1 97. Here, as elsewhere, one would expect reductions in accuracy as the price of administrative savings.
The question for policymakers is whether that price in accuracy outweighs the savings
administrative costs. We would imagine that a strong case can be made for scheduling most
damages.
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C. Who Can Bring a Claim?
We have already argued that the universe of Smokers' Compensation
claimants should be limited to smokers themselves, their estates, and their
subrogated insurers (private or public) . This limitation suggests the following
question: Under this approach, what class of potential claimants would be
excluded from bringing a claim?
The most obvious class would be victims of environmental tobacco
smoke ["ETS"], what used to be called passive or second-hand smoke. One
could imagine a Smokers' Compensation system that would allow ETS
victims to bring claims . However, given our interest in deterrence rather
than in compensation, and given the administrative-cost problems that ETS
claims would present, we would not recommend allowing ETS claims. As
for the deterrence concern, it would be extremely difficult, if not impossible,
to allocate ETS damages among manufacturers on anything other than a
market-share basis (or an ex ante relative-risk basis) . Therefore, one of the
principal reasons for preferring an ex post incentive-based approach to, say,
an ex ante approach (such as an excise tax) does not exist with respect to
ETS exposure. In addition, if the system were made available to ETS
claimants, administrative costs would soar, as the sheer number of claimants
would rise dramatically. So ETS claimants would probably be excluded . 1 98
Of those smoking victims whom we would allow to bring a Smokers'
Compensation claim, perhaps the claimants that need the most justification
are the insurers of the smokers. Under the system we propose, insurers
would also be allowed to bring claims to recover for benefits they have paid
to smokers or to families of smokers. By " insurer" here we mean not only
private health, disability, and life insurers, but also federal and state

1 98. If, however, the Smokers' Compensation system were thought to be a desirable means of
compensating those harmed by smoking (and not just a deterrence mechanism), the additional
administrative costs of such a system might be worth incurring. Moreover, it should be noted that
allowing ETS claims, if done in tandem with �ubstantial limitations on the types of damages that
could be recovered, would not necessarily break the bank. For example, we might allow claims to
be brought by nonsmokers who suffer from lung cancer or emphysema and who can demonstrate
that they work in a setting in which smoking is allowed and have worked in that setting for a given
number of years,Jocumented by employment records. Or we might allow ETS claims to be brought
by family members of smokers. Again, however, because these costs would not be readily allocable
among manufacturers on a brand-specific causal basis, the deterrence benefit of Smokers'
Compensation (over an excise tax) would be lost. In addition, even if Smokers' Compensation were
an effective means of internalizing ETS-related harms, the efficiency case for imposing those harms
on cigarette manufacturers instead of, say, on employers or on owners of public buildings, is
somewhat less strong that is the efficiency case for imposing the costs to smokers themselves (and
the costs to their insurers) on cigarette companies. See Hanson & Logue, supra note 3, at 1 3 1 2- 1 5 .
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governments acting as health, disability, and life insurers through programs
such as Medicare, Medicaid , and the like . Allowing insurers to recover a
Smokers' Compensation claim would be comparable (although perhaps not

identical) to what is done currently by many private insurers-by way of the
doctrine of subrogation-when their policyholders suffer insured losses for
which some third party can be held legally responsible. 1 99 The justification
for allowing insurers to recover under a quasi-subrogation theory is
straightforward: Doing so ensures that the costs of relevant smoking-related
harms ultimately will be borne by the manufacturers (and, through the price
mechanism, ultimately by smokers), rather than by the nonsmokers in the
insurance pools . Thus, first-party health, disability, and life insurance
premiums (or, in the case of Medicare and Medicaid, the costs of those
programs) would fall-just as cigarette prices would rise. 200
Another benefit of allowing insurers to bring claims is that it may
significantly simplify the administration of the Smokers' Compensation
program. Insurers would have an incentive to aggregate claims in the most
cost-effective manner and to stream-line the process of administering and
settling claims . Because the insurers would be operating in the shadow of
the Smokers' Compensation regime, even the aggregated claims and mass
settlements (if they occur) would still send the brand-specific causal message
to manufacturers (if it is cost-effective to do so). In other words, the
manufacturers whose cigarettes are relatively more dangerous, and hence
give rise to relatively large or numerous claims, would be forced to accept

199. See generally ROBERT E. KEETON & ALAN I. WIDISS, INSURANCE LAW: A GUIDE TO FUNDAMENTAL
PRINCIPLES, LEOAL DOCTRINES, AND COMMERCIAL PRACTICES 2 1 9-52 (1988).
200. The doctrine of subrogation is typically defended, by courts and commentators, as a necessary
means of protecting the time-honored insurance-law principle of"indemnity." See id. at 220-2 1 .
This principle, which serves as the basis for a number of insurance-law doctrines (such as the
"insurable interest" doctrine), holds that "insurance contracts shall confer a benefit no greater in
value than the loss suffered by an insured." Id. at 135. And this principle of indemnity, in tum,
is based on the idea that we do not want insurance contracts to produce net gains for the insureds,
but rather we want them only to cover losses. Id. at 1 36-39; Croley & Hanson, Nonpecuniary
Costs, supra note 37, at 1 854. That idea can be justified on consumer-sovereignty grounds-that is,
most purchasers of insurance, being risk averse after all (at least with respect to the risks for which
they seek insurance), want to shift the risk of loss from themselves to their insurers. To allow
policyholders double recovery in the event of an insured loss would be tantamount to allowing
gambling, which is not thought to be the reason that people enter into insurance contracts. What
is more, to the extent the insured had control over the probability or magnitude of the insured loss,
the potential for double recovery could produce a significant moral hazard problem. See KEETON
& Wm1ss, supra note 199, at 1 36-39. Without the principle of indemnity and the doctrine of
subrogation (whether provided expI icitly in the insurance contract or implied by a court), insureds
would be able to recover twice for some harms, a possibility that would produce an increase in
premiums that most risk-averse insureds would prefer not to pay.
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relatively expensive deals with subrogated first-party insurers, thus sending

the desired deterrence message.

D . How Does One Prove a Smoking-Related Injury?
Questions of causation arise at three levels.

First is the question of

general causation: could a given harm have been caused by smoking

cigarettes? If the answer to that question is affirmative, the system must then
determine whether, in the given case, tobacco actually did cause the harm
(claimant 's specific causation) and, if so, which brand or brands of cigarettes
actually' caused the harm (brand-specific causation). In this section we look
at questions of whether smoking generally caused a claimant's injury, that
is , general and claimant-specific causation. In the next section we will
examine how to establish brand-specific causation.
1 . General Causation: Could Smoking Have Caused the Injury ?

The question of general causation may logically be subsumed within the
specific causation inquiry. After all, in answering the question, "did

smoking cause the claimant's injury?, " the tribunal would also be addressing
the more general question of whether such an injury could possibly result
from smoking. Typically, however, causation-based compensation systems
201
separate the two inquiries to reduce administrative costs .
General
causation serves as a gatekeeper, only admitting plausible claims .

a. Thresholds
As a limited-purpose system designed to compensate only certain harms,
the first inquiry of a Smokers' Compensation board would likely be to
determine whether cigarette smoking could have caused the injury claimed.
The decision-maker would have to establish whether the claim has sufficient
merit to warrant a hearing . Claims might fail that test and thus be non
compensable because the type of injury is not considered smoking-related,
or because the claimant's smoking history is not considered likely to have
resulted in the injury alleged. To minimize administrative costs, these
standards may be pre-established

as

thresholds. The system may compensate

201 . Examples include the limitation of the Childhood Vaccine Compensation Program to certain
diseases, see supra note I 56 and accompanying text, and the presumptions of the Black Lung
program, see supra note I 55 and accompanying text.
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only for certain diseases that are considered more than likely to result from
smoking.202 Only people who have smoked a given number of packs per day
and a given number of years might be eligible to bring claims . To increase
the accuracy of the system, the thresholds may vary depending on the injury.
A science panel might establish, for instance, that some diseases are likely

to develop after five years of smoking while others arise only after ten years .
Similarly, claims for certain diseases with known, constant latency periods
might also be barred until a given period of time has passed.

Because such thresholds will bar non-conforming claims , the levels at
which they are set will greatly shape the system. The question of thresholds
makes plain the tension between accuracy and cost. The cheapest option
would be to set very strict thresholds so that only presumptively valid claims
are allowed. If, for example, only claims by twenty-year smokers with lung
cancer or emphysema were heard, the subsequent decision as to whether this
claimant was injured by smoking would be simplified . The trade-off, of
course, is that a large number of would-be claimants injured by tobacco
products would not be compensated, and the deterrence objective of the
system would be significantly compromised. Greater accuracy might mean
a large variety of thresholds, depending on the amount smoked, injury,
demographic factors, or other considerations . It might mean simply a low
threshold that only weeds out obviously frivolous claims . As in crafting
other aspects of the system, the threshold level should be set based on
considerations of the marginal cost of increasing accuracy and the political
realities discussed above.

b. Smoking History
A Smokers' Compensation system could, just as our current tort system
may, ·create incentives for people diagnosed with diseases that are often
smoking-related to overstate the extent to which they smoke.
By
exaggerating his or her smoking history, a claimant may be able to overcome
certain evidentiary thresholds or enjoy certain evidentiary presumptions that
the system might employ. Our preliminary investigations suggest, however,
that problem is unlikely to be significant. Smokers and former smokers

202. Cf Frank J. Vandall, Rea/locating the Costs ofSmoking: The Application ofAbsolute Liability to
Cigarette Manufacturers, 52 OHIO ST. L.J. 405, 423 (199 1 ) (proposing a presumption of causation
with respect only to cancer of the lung, larynx, oral cavity, and esophagus within a system of
absolute liability for cigarette manufacturers).
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would likely be able to establish their smoking histories credibly and
relatively inexpensively . 203
The effects of long-term smoking often manifest themselves in ways that
can be identified through reasonably straightforward medical tests . For
example, long-term smokers often develop Chronic Obstructive Pulmonary
Disease (COPD), 204 and even many short-term and medium-term smokers

develop symptoms related to but less serious than those of COPD. COPD
is a clinical term for patients with chronic bronchitis , emphysema, or a
mixture of the two . 205 Pulmonary function testing with spirometry to
measure lung volume is a simple, inexpensive, and effective preliminary
indicator of COPD and other smoking-caused reductions in lung function.
The so-called "FEV test, " which is a measure of forced expiratory volume
1
per one second (the amount of air exhaled during the first second of
expiration) , shows smokers to have a greatly reduced volume. 206 COPD's
symptoms sometime emerge in the early stages of smoking, but typically
develop fully over the course of twenty to thirty years, worsening over
time. 207 Smoking cessation can only partially, and usually insignificantly

203. Put differently, manufacturers, with the aid of witnesses or medical tests, could, where appropriate,
rebut any overstated or fraudulent smoking-history claims.
204. Se� DAVID DAIL & SAMUEL P. HAMMAR, PULMONARY PATHOLOGY 835 (2d ed. 1 994). Smokers also
develop brown pigmented macrophages (which are blood cells that clear particles from the lungs).
The small airways have "prominent intraluminal collections of slightly pigmented alveolar
macrophages ("smokers macrophages") which are crowded into tight clusters. See Anthony A. Gal
& Michael N. Koss, Differential Diagnosis, in PATHOLOGY: PULMONARY DISORDERS 40 (Jonathan
I. Epsten, ed. 1 997).
205. See KiusTINE NAPIER ET AL., THE AMERICAN COUNCIL ON SCIENCE AND HEALTH, CIGARETTES: WHAT
THE WARNING LABEL DOESN'T TELLYou 9 ( 1996); see also id. ("Cigarette smoking is the single
most important cause of both chronic bronchitis and emphysema; it accounts for almost all cases
of both.").
206. See JOHN B. WEST, PULMONARY PATHOPHYSIOLOGY 68-77 (1 992); see also id. at 71 ("[S]ome
physicians regard this prolonged time as a useful simple bedside index of obstruction."). In
addition, more involved inert gas elimination techniques can also be used to test ventilation and gas
exchange abnormalities. Id.
207. See GERALD L. BAUM & EMANUEL WOLINSKY, TEXTBOOK OF PULMONARY DISEASES 1 004 (1994)
("Functional abnormalities ·have consistently been demonstrated in survey studies in male and
female smokers of all ages. The extent of these abnormalities worsens with advancing age and
increased tobacco consumption.").
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reverse the effects of the disease . 208 Thus, damages from years of smoking
are often evident from spirometric tests . 209

In addition to spirometric tests (and other simple medical tests, including
urine tests, blood tests, and chest x-rays) , which can be administered at the
time a claim is made, claimants can also be required to provide corroborative
evidence in the form of, say , affidavits from doctors, friends, co-workers
and others who may have been in a position to observe the claimant's
smoking habit in years prior to the claim being made . 2 1 0 In sum, it appears

that there may be reasonably reliable and inexpensive ways to verify a
claimant's alleged smoking history . It is unsurprising, therefore, that
establishing a claimant's smoking history has generally not posed a
significant source of dispute in tort suits brought by smokers against cigarette
manufacturers . 2 1 1
2. Claimant-Specific Causation: Did Smoking Cause the Injury ?

Of course, a determination that smoking could have caused any
compensable injury does not imply that, in the given case, smokin.g did cause
the injury. Although smoking gives rise to several signature diseases (e . g . ,
lung cancer, oral cancer, emphysema) ,2 1 2 some smoking-related diseases

208. See id. at 1012 ("Smoking cessation does not result in appreciable improvements in lung function
in most patients . . . . Improvement in lung function was detected by spirometry and by the single- .
breath nitrogen test after both reduction and the cessation of smoking. While statistically
significant, the average magnitude of the change was quite small. These findings were confirmed
in another study of similar design, and they indicate that the reversible component of cigarette
smoke-induced lung injury is relatively slight, even in the earlier stages ofCOPD.").
209. See id. It might be argued that such symptoms are often caused by air pollution. However, the
evidence indicates that air pollution would be a rare and minor contributor to such symptoms as
compared to smoking. In the words of two physicians who have studied the matter, "personal
pollution (cigarette smoking) is more than a hundred times worse than general air pollution in terms
of simple particulates." DAIL & HAMMAR, supra note 206, at 834. Furthermore, "outdoor air
pollution levels in most Western cities are probably not high enough to cause . . . clinically
significant impairment of lung function except in persons with unusual susceptibility." JOHN F.
MURRAY & JAY A. NADEL, TEXTBOOK OF RESPIRATORY MEDICINE 1 27 1 (1 994). Of course, if
manufacturers believe that pollution, and not smoking, is the cause of such symptoms in a particular
claimant, they may be given the opportunity to rebut any presumption created by the tests with the
use of other types of evidence.
2 1 0. A Smokers' Compensation system could certainly adjust compensation levels a<;cording to what
evidentiary thresholds a claimant is able to clear.
2 1 1 . Interview of Richard Daynard (November 1 7, 1997); Norwood Wilner (November 1 7, 1997).
2 1 2. See supra note 47.
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have more than one potential cause. 21 3 In trying to assign responsibility
among potential causes, there are several standards that the system might
invoke: the "arising from " standard borrowed from workers' compensation
law, the preponderance of the evidence standard familiar from tort law, and
the "probabilistic causation" approach that many scholars have
recommended in contexts where causation takes place, if at all, at the
molecular level. The choice of standard of specific causation required
implicates the likelihood of bringing a successful claim and thus the
1
effectiveness of the system as well as the administrative costs . 2 4

a.

"Arising from "

Under workers' compensation's "arising from" standard, a smoker who
could show that smoking was a contributing factor to her disease would
prove specific causation.
Workers' compensation, which evolved in
response to industrial accidents, has struggled to account for occupational
disease. In many cases, it is not at all clear that a worker exposed to toxic
fumes develops cancer as a result of that exposure rather than genetics or
environmental toxins .
Long latency periods complicate the inquiry.
Workers' compensation systems generally consider a disease "occupational"
5
if the victim was likely to have contracted it due to the nature of his work. 21

The distinctive nature of the work may be in the type of risk to which it
exposes workers, such as those working around toxic chemicals, or the
degree to which workers must face everyday risks, such as a worker
handling ice all day. 21 6 A disease which may be common may nevertheless

become occupational if the employment facilitates its transmission. For
example, a telephone operator who contracted tuberculosis qualified for
workers' compensation because it was found that the close-fitting mouthpiece
she used at work contributed to her contraction of the disease . 217 The

2 1 3 . In addition to the signature diseases, smoking is known to be a significant contributor to cancer of
the bladder, kidney, pancreas, stomach, and cervix. Michael C. Fiore, Cigarelle Smoking: A
Clinical Guide to Assessment and Treatment, 76 MED. CLINICS OF N. AM. 305, 3 1 8-22 ( 1992). The
causal relationship between smoking and heart disease was first established nearly 60 years ago, in
1 940, by the Mayo Clinic. Carl E. Bartecchi et al., The Human Costs of Tobacco Use, 330 NEW
ENG. J. MED 907, 907 ( 1994). Nearly one-fifth of deaths from cardiovascular disease are
attributable to smoking according to the Office of Technology Assessment. Id.
2 14. For a general discussion of the deterrence concerns raised by choices among burdens of proof, see
Kaplow, supra note 36, at 358-{;2 (describing how choosing burden of proof so as to optimize
deterrence is a function of, among other things, the social cost of sanctions).
2 1 5 . 1 ARTHUR LARSON, LARSON'S WORKERS. COMPENSATION LAW 7-100 (desk ed. 1976 & Supp. 1997).
2 1 6. Id. at 7-1 1 3 to 7-1 14.
2 1 7. Id. at 7-1 07.
.
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employment need not be the sole or even dominant cause , so long as it
contributes to development of the disease .218
Following this standard theoretically would allow a great number of
smokers to collect damages for their injuries.2 19 A claimant would need only
show that her injury was in some way furthered by smoking to recover fully
through the Smokers ' Compensation system. For example, the medical
evidence indicates rather unequivocally that smoking contributes to the
likelihood of contracting heart disease .220 Given that evidence, most long

time smokers could likely show that their heart disease was complicated or
accelerated by smoking, and, thus, under an "arising from" standard, receive
full compensation. Such a system carries the risk of "overdeterrence, " in
that tobacco companies may end up paying for injuries they did not cause ,
or at least that they alone did not cause. If so, this approach would constitute
a policy decision to make cigarette manufacturers subsidize certain health
care costs of smokers. Some smokers would be getting an extra benefit from
the tobacco companies-payment for non-smoking-related injuries-in addition
to compensation for their smoking-related injuries. As we explain below,
however, it may be possible to reduce compensation in such a way as to
minimize the overdeterrence (or subsidy) problem.

b. Preponderance of the evidence
Under the traditional cause-in-fact standard found in tort law, smokers
would have to show that tobacco was more likely than not the cause of their
injury. This is sometimes called the "preponderance of the evidence" rule.
Whereas the "arising from" standard would allow any claim in which
tobacco played a role, a preponderance of the evidence standard would raise
the bar. Tobacco would have to be a dominant cause of the disease rather
than simply a contributing factor. In cases such as mass toxic torts and
tobacco-related harms, the reliance on statistical evidence means that a strong
preponderance rule, requiring "particularistic proof" of causation as to the

2 1 8. Id. at 7-124.
2 19. In theory, anyway. Despite this apparently liberal standard, the workers' compensation system does
not get high marks for responding to occupational disease. The American Law Institute Reporters'
Study, for example, called workers' compensation "notably unsuccessful in delivering
compensation" to occupational disease victims. AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, ENTERPRISE
RESPONSIBILITY FOR PERSONAL INJURY: VOLUME I: THE INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK 1 1 1 ( 1 99 1 )
[hereinafter A.L.I., FRAMEWORK].
220. See Bartecchi et al., supra note 2 13, at 907 ("[I]t has been well documented that cigarette smoking
substantially increases the risk of cardiovascular disease, including stroke, sudden death, heart
attack, peripheral vascular disease, and aortic aneurysm.").
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individual, bars all claims.221 While epidemiological evidence shows a clear
causal connection between smoking and, say, lung cancer, little is known
about how smoking causes lung cancer. The state of science is such that a
claimant simply cannot prove by a preponderance of the evidence that in her
particular case, her disease was the result of smoking.
A weak
preponderance rule, one that allows statistical proof of causation provided
the risk at issue accounts for greater than 50 % of the risk, has the same
result in many cases, since the toxic risk rarely exceeds the background
risk. 222
This "all-or-nothing" approach has some significant drawbacks,
particularly in contexts where causation can be demonstrated only
probabilistically. Suppose, for example, that science demonstrates quite
clearly that smoking nearly doubles a person's risk of heart disease (a
probability factor of just under 50 %). Smokers with heart disease would be
unable, absent some additional evidence, to collect in a Smokers'
Compensation system that adopted a "preponderance of the evidence" causal
requirement. Alternatively, if science demonstrated that smoking just barely
doubles a person's risks of heart disease (a probability factor of just over
50%), then manufacturers would be liable in circumstances when their
products were not responsible (or at least not fully responsible) for the
claimant's harm. Consequently, a "preponderance of the evidence"
approach risks underdeterring or overdeterring cigarette manufacturers and
their consumers.
c. Probabilistic Causation and Proportional Liability

The problems with those two causal standards help to highlight the
potential benefits of a "probabilistic causation" approach. This approach
allows claimants to use epidemiological and statistical evidence to establish
probable specific causation, and then discounts damages accordingly. If we
suppose again that smoking nearly doubles the risk of heart disease (assume
a probability factor of 45 % ) , under probabilistic causation a claimant with
heart disease would collect 45 % of the costs she has incurred. In 55 % of the
cases, smokers' heart disease would not be caused by smoking, but all
smokers could win discounted damages for their heart disease. In the
aggregate, then, the industry would thus pay the full cost of the injuries it is

22 1 . Rosenberg, supra note 36, at 858.
222. Id.
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causing, albeit not to the exact victims since they cannot be accurately
identified. 223
Proposals for probabilistic causation have grown out of toxic tort cases
that pose many of the same proof-of-causation dilemmas that smoking does.
Both types of cases face what the American Law Institute Reporters' Study
terms "individual attribution uncertainty. " This problem arises when trying
to use aggregate statistics to show specific causation.224 Epidemiology might
show statistics that, among smokers with lung cancer, 95 % of the lung
cancer cases are caused by smoking (i.e. , general causation), but a smoker
with lung cancer may not be able to prove that he is in that 95 % (i.e. ,
specific causation). Unlike traditional notions of causation, the probabilistic
notion does not depend on physiological evidence of causation in the victim.
Troyen Brennan and Robert Carter argue that such a change in concepts of
causation mirrors changes in scientific thought. Science no longer looks for
absolute, deductive explanations of occurrences, but allows for
probabilities.225
Brennan and Carter acknowledge the difficulty of
establishing a statistically precise probability factor, but believe that with
epidemiological studies and expert testimony, fact-finders could generally
"arrive at some good estimate of the probability of causation in the individual
case . "226 Epidemiologists whom we have spoken with about the specific
topic of smoking-caused illness agree.
This notion of causation based on probability is particularly apt in cancer
cases.227 Scientists do not know precisely how carcinogenesis occurs, a fact
that makes proof of causation in any individual case difficult. Indeed, it is
on that basis that cigarette manufacturers have long maintained that there is
no "proof" that smoking causes cancer. Yet there is ample statistical and
epidemiological evidence for scientists to infer with confidence that smoking
causes some types of cancer. Basing causation on statistical probability
accounts for the known correlation in the aggregate despite the inability to
prove causation in the individual.
For these reasons, probabilistic recovery may be appropriate for
smoking-related harms, harms that involve the same sort of clear but difficult

223. For a leading work on notions of proportional liability, see id.
224. AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, ENTERPRISE RESPONSIBILITY FOR PERSONAL INJURY: VOLUME II:
APPROACHES TO LEGAL AND INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE 326-27 ( 1 99 1 ) [hereinafter A.L.I.,
APPROACHES].
225. Troyen A. Brennan & Robert F. Carter, legal and Scientific Probability ofCausation of Cancer and
Other Environmental Disease in Individuals, I 0 J. OF HEALTH POL., PoL'Y & L. 33, 39 (1985).
226. Id. at 58. This task might be undertaken by an advisory science panel. See infra notes 272-84 and
accompanying text.
227. See Brennan & Carter, supra note 225, at 58.
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to prove causal link that is found in other settings in which probabilistic
recovery is most frequently recommended. For example, the American Law
Institute Reporters' Study endorsed Professor Rosenberg 's recommendation
of proportional liability in environmental .tort cases. 228 Brennan and Carter
also recommend applying proportional liability to cases in which an
increased risk is attributed to an "environmental agent. "229 Some states have
begun to tum theory into practice in their workers' compensation programs.
For one specific example, Arksansas currently allows for probabilistic
recovery in occupational disease cases. If an occupational disease is
aggravated by another noncompensable disease, or if work plays a role in
aggravating another disease, compensation may be reduced accordingly. 230
While probabilistic recovery may be the most accurate means of
establishing specific causation on a system-wide (rathei: than individual)
level, such accuracy carries with it administrative costs. Successfully
implementing probabilistic recovery would require experts to establish the
probability factors of smoking with respect to various harms in a variety of
situations. If these determinations are to be as accurate as possible, they
wouid be made on a case-by-case basis; after all, accurate probabilities will
depend on the other potential causes of the harm to which the claimant may
have been subject. Such inquiries would be expensive, however, both in
terms of fact-finders' time and to the parties, who would almost certainly
need to hire attorneys, conduct discovery, and adopt other trappings of
litigation.
The administrative costs of case-by-case probability determinations most
likely outweigh the accuracy benefits, particularly as those costs fall heavily
on the parties. The goal, then, in designing the system is to determine what
level of accuracy yields the benefits equal to its costs. A science panel might
establish probability charts depending on demographic variables, quantity
and brand smoked, family histories, employment conditions, and so on. The
degree of detail will be contingent upon the optimization calculus and
political realities. 231

228.
229.
230.
23 1 .

A.LI., APPROACHES, supra note 224, at 3 7 1 .
Brennan & Carter, supra note 225, at 59.
Ark. Code Ann. § l 1-9-601 (c)( 1 ) (1 987).
It is worth reiterating that the theoretical optimization point is arguably oflittle utility in identifying
the appropriate level of detail. Although on a macro level, the complexity of the probabil ity
determinations should be increased until the marginal accuracy benefit equals the marginal cost,
political considerations are unlikely to operate on that principle. The costs of administering the
Smokers' Compensation system will fall either on the government or the industry, in all like) ihood.
If on the government, the policymakers may be expected to put a premium on keeping costs down,
even ifthe result is that the system is less likely to compensate the right victims the correct amount.
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d. Evidentiary Presumptions

While probabilistic causation has been recommended for cases similar
to those posed by cigarettes, it has not been widely implemented. A more
common feature of proposed causation-based compensation systems is the
use of evidentiary presumptions.
Garner, Ausness, and Lebel all propose presumptions of causation for
certain diseases depending on the claimant's smoking history.232 Rabin
discusses two proposed systems for mass toxic tort cases that would create
rebuttable presumptions of causation when the alleged source of the harm
was in the hazardous waste business (generation, transport, or disposal) at
the time of exposure, the claimant was exposed, and the injury was of the
kind known to result from such exposure.233 There is also precedent for
presumptions of causation in federal law, as they are key features of both the
Black Lung Benefits Program and the National Vaccine Injury Compensation
Program. 234
Presumptions could play a role in Smokers' Compensation by reducing
the obstacle facing claimants of proving a causal connection that is often
difficult or costly to establish. Presumptions could also be used to expedite
the claims process by avoiding the necessity of proving repeatedly that, for
example, smoking causes lung cancer. Smokers' Compensation might
include presumptions that smoking over a certain number of years causes
certain diseases. Depending on the system, such prescriptions could be
rebuttable or irrebuttable.
Failure to satisfy the conditions of the
presumption might, depending on the system, bar compensable claims from
being brought, or it might simply shift the burden of proving causation to the
claimant.

If the industry funds the system, the policymakers would have an incentive to maximize accuracy
determinations beyond the optimization point since the cigarette manufacturers would be footing
the bill.
232. See supra notes 1 34--46 and accompanying text.
233. Rabin, supra note 53, at 96 1 .
234. The law establishing the Black Lung Benefits Program created two rebuttable presumptions for
miners with at least ten years' experience in the mines: I) that pneumoconiosis (black lung disease)
is work-related; and 2) that death due to respiratory disease is caused by pneumoconiosis. There
were also two irrebuttable presumptions concerning miners with complicated pneumoconiosis: I )
that the miner i s totally disabled; and 2) that death was due to the disease. Federal Coal Mine
Health and Safety Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-173, § 4 1 l (c); 83 Stat. 742, 793 (1969). Subsequent
amendments created new presumptions and eliminated others. The National Vaccine program relies
on a "nearly irrefutable presumption of liability" for certain diseases contracted within a given
period of time from vaccination. Rabin, supra note 53, at 959.
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3. The Cigarette Card: Either Credit Card or Stored Value Technology

Another method of gathering information regarding a person's smoking
history-for purposes of determining both general causation and claim-specific
causation-would involve an idea that we first introduced in the Yale article;
namely, the "cigarette card. "235 The idea would be to require individuals
who wish to smoke first to purchase a cigarette card. This card would then
have to be presented to the cigarette retailer, at the time of purchase,
whenever a pack of cigarettes is purchased. As described in that article, the
card could be designed along the lines of a credit card or ATM card so that
every time a cigarette purchase occurred information regarding the brand of
cigarette being purchased, the date of purchase, the number of packs,
perhaps the age of the purchaser, among other things, would be recorded.
Then, if a smoker were later to bring a Smokers' Compensation claim
against cigarette manufacturers, the smoker's cigarette-card information
could be used to help resolve the difficult causal issues discussed in the
preceding two subsections. This information could also be used to determine
how to allocate the damages among cigarette manufacturers (in cases in
which the smoker has smoked multiple brands) so as to maximize the brand
specific deterrence effect of the Smokers' Compensation regime. 236
Notwithstanding the deterrence benefits of the cigarette card idea
(discussed in greater detail in the earlier article), this version of the cigarette
card idea-the credit-card version-is subject to two principal criticisms, the
first having to do with administrative costs and the second having to do with
privacy concerns. The administrative costs of such a system would
obviously be substantial. Every store that sold cigarettes would be required
to have a machine that could read the cigarette card, and that machine would
have to be connected to the cigarette-card network, which presumably would
be done over a telephone line. Those machines would cost money, and
maintaining the network would cost money . The privac.y concern seems to
be the most troubling aspect of the cigarette-card idea for most people (based
on the feedback we have received from the Yale article). Many are
extremely troubled by the notion that detailed information regarding
everyone's smoking habits would be kept in some central data-bank.
In the Yale article, we offer some responses to these administrative-cost
and privacy concerns,237 and we will not rehearse those responses here.

235. See Hanson & Logue, supra note 3, at 1291-95.
236. See infra Part IV.E.
237. See Hanson & Logue, supra note 3, at 1 292, 1295.
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Rather, we will suggest an alternative version of the cigarette card that might
entail lower administrative costs than the credit-card version and that would
virtually eliminate the privacy concerns. Instead of using credit-card
technology, which stores information in a central data-bank, we might adopt
the so-called stored value technology, which stores information instead on
a magnetic strip or tiny computer chip embedded in the card itself.
The potential administrative-cost savings would come from not having
to maintain a network connecting all of the cigarette-card machines or a
centralized databank. Each cigarette retailer need only have a machine that
can read the data on the card. And the privacy benefits would be enormous.
All of the information that would be so valuable for purposes of determining
causation (and, as we will see in the next section, for allocating payments
among companies)-number of packs and brand purchased, dates of purchase,
age at time of purchase, etc.-could all be kept on one's own cigarette card.
And that information would be seen by no one but the smoker, unless and
until the smoker decided to bring a Smokers' Compensation claim, at which
point the card would be presented and mined for data that would be relevant
to the causal determinations not only in that particular case but in other cases
as well.238 It is our understanding that the technology already exists for
creating stored-value cigarette cards along the lines we have described.239
One major drawback of the type of stored-value card just described is
that, if the card is lost, all of the valuable data regarding the individual's
smoking history would be lost as well.240 There are a number of potential
responses to that problem that the Smokers' Compensation regime might
adopt, if it were to use a stored-value cigarette card. First, we could do
nothing; that is, we could just count on smokers to keep up with their cards,
and if they lose their cards require them to go through all of the standard
methods of establishing causation that were discussed in the preceding two

238. And although one might complain about the loss of privacy at that point, such a complaint would
not be specific to a Smokers' Compensation regime, but rather would apply to any compensation
regime that requires the smoker to make a factual showing regarding her smoking history.
239. For a thorough discussion of the stored-value card (the technology behind it, its growing use as a
system of payment that may eventually rival the credit card and the check, and its overall
advantages and disadvantages), see generally RONALD J. MANN, PAYMENT SYSTEMS AND OTHER
FINANCIAL TRANSACTIONS (forthcoming Aspen 1999) (copy of manuscript on file with authors).
240. What we have thus far been discussing is a version of an "unaccountable" stored-value card. With
such a card, the data exists only on the card. If the card is lost or stolen, the data is lost. An
alternative is the "accountable" stored-value card, which stores the information not only on the card
itself but also at some centralized backup location so that if the card is lost or stolen, the operator
of the system can reconstruct the lost data from the centralized data bank. Id. See MANN supra note
241 (manuscript Assignment 15, at 2-3). Most of the stored-value cards currently in use are of the
unaccountable variety. Id.
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sections. Second, we could try to develop methods by which smokers could
back up the data from their cards onto their home computers or in some
other way. This approach would add to administrative costs, and it may be
impractical to expect smokers to be so conscientious as to regularly back up
their cigarette cards. Third, we could develop a system that would back up
the cigarette-card data at the point of purchase and store the information, not
only on the card itself, but also in some centralized location. 241 Although this
approach would seem to reintroduce all of the administrative-cost and
privacy concerns that the stored-valued card was intended to eliminate, that
need not necessarily be so. It might be possible to design a backup system,
where individuals' cigarette data could be stored centrally, but that would
allow access to that data only by the smoker herself in cases in which her
card is lost or stolen. In other words, although the data would be gathered
and stored by some third party (perhaps the federal government or perhaps
some private company would administer the system), by law the only parties
who would be allowed to gain access to the information would be the smoker
herself or someone authorized by her to retrieve the information.242 This
would not eliminate the privacy concern. The information would still be out
there. But it would lessen the concern.
In any event, we do not pretend to know the optimal tradeoff among the
privacy concerns, the administrative-cost · concerns, and the deterrence
concerns in connection with the cigarette card. We mean here only to make
clear that the tradeoff exists.
E. How Are Payments Allocated Among Companies?
If, as is true of the vast majority of smokers, a claimant smoked only one
brand of cigarette or several brands of cigarettes produced by the same
manufacturer,243 then establishing claimant-specific causation would be
sufficient. When the smoking-related injuries must be divided among
multiple brands produced by multiple manufacturers, however, a Smokers'
Compensation system needs to allocate liability across different brands. As
we have seen, Ausness and Lebel do not address this question; under their
proposals, damages across manufacturers would be financed by excise taxes

24 1 . This would be a version of the accountable stored-value card, discussed supra note 240.
242. There is some evidence that the technology exists to develop this sort of backup system as well,
although such systems are not currently in wide use where stored-value cards are being used.
MANN, supra note 239 (manuscript Assignment 1 5, at 2-3).
243. See supra note 46.
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such that liability would, in effect, be determined by market share. 244 The
Black Lung and National Vaccine programs are similarly funded by taxes, 245
with liability allocated according to market share rather than causal share.
1. Division ofLiability

In this subsection, we identify five possible methods of allocating liability
among cigarette manufacturers other than market-share liability. We begin
with the least accurate and probably least administratively expensive and
move toward the most accurate and most expensive. We do not speculate
here as to whether the trade-off in terms of greater accuracy justifies the
added administrative costs. Our goal is simply to highlight a few of the
possible options.
First, responsibiiity could be divided equally among the manufacturers
that produced cigarettes smoked by the claimant. This method would be the
easiest to administer, as it would require only information regarding which
brands were smoked and some basic arithmetic. Such an approach is at least
one step better than an allocation based solely on market-share, because
under an equal allocation approach only those companies that manufactured
the particular smoker's cigarettes would pay for that smoker's harms. If
many consumers are reasonably brand loyal or if those who are not brand
loyal switch brands randomly (at random time intervals),246 then
manufacturers of relatively safe cigarettes should thrive, and competition for
safety should emerge. Nevertheless, the nexus between causation and
payment of damages might be fairly attenuated, reducing the beneficial
incentive effects of the system.
Second, rather than dividing liability equally, a Smokers' Compensation
System could pro-rate liability according to the length of time a smoker
consumed each manufacturer's product. This method would require the
factfinder to establish additional information, and thus would add to the
administrative costs of the process. Presumably, however, pro-rated liability
could represent an improvement over the equal allocation method proposed
immediately above, inasmuch as it would allocate damages in a way that

244. See supra note 144 and accompanying text.
245. 26 U.S.C. § 9501 (1 994) (Black Lung); 26 U.S.C. § 95 1 0 (1 994) (National Vaccine).
246. If brand switching were independent ofthe risks posed by the different brands, then makers of more
dangerous cigarettes would bear more liability. To be sure, in some cases, those manufacturers will
be charged only halfofthe damages (assuming only two brands smoked) when they caused more
than half. However, they will more often be charged half than the other brands because, by
hypothesis, their cigarettes are more dangerous.
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more closely approximated the harm done by the respective manufacturers.
This approach, too, may have problems. For example, insofar as smokers
systematically smoke disproportionately dangerous cigarettes for
disproportionately short durations, this equal allocation-by-time method will
not yield an ideal deterrence signal. To help address any such problem, this
allocation system could adopt a rebuttable presumption that all cigarettes are
equally dangerous.247 Manufacturers of demonstrably safer cigarettes would
be permitted to rebut that presumption and thereby reduce their shares of
liability. 248
Estimating the number of cigarettes smoked of each brand would further
refine the allocation process. It may be that a smoker begins smoking a half
a-pack-per-day of Brand X and does so for 10 years. If that person then
moves on to Brand Y for another 10 years, while also increasing
consumption to a pack per day, she has smoked twice as many Brand Y
cigarettes, though the time frame for each brand was the same. Donald
Garner has suggested the per-number means of allocating liability, coupled
with a rebuttable presumption that cigarettes are equally dangerous.249
Underlying both the time-and number-allocation approaches is an assumption
that it does not matter if a cigarette is the first or last smoked.
For a variety of reasons, it may be desirable to allocate on other than a
pro-rata basis. One possibility is a "winner-take-all" system, by which the
manufacturer who produced the most cigarettes smoked by the claimant
assumes all liability. This method would reduce administrative costs
incurred as a result of disputes among manufacturers with regard to who
should bear what portion of the liability. If we assume a random distribution
of smoking patterns across brands, this method should balance out

247. See Gamer, supra note 1 34, at 3 1 6-17.
248. Although the administrative board may lack information to judge adequately the relative riskiness
of cigarettes, manufacturers probably do not. By placing the burden on manufacturers, therefore,
the presumption forces the well informed manufacturer to inform the poorly informed regulator.
Furthermore, it does so in a way that pits manufacturers against manufacturers in contrast to the
current regime in which manufacturers' regulatory incentives is basically to stick to one simple
story-there is no proof that cigarettes of any type cause cancer and smoking cigarettes is not
addictive. A code of silence in response to such a presumption, however, is certainly not
unimaginable given the industry's history, and would partially undermine the primary motivation
of ex post incentive-based regulation by sharply reducing care-level considerations from
manufacturing decisions. While this behavior would not be in individual companies' best interests,
oligopolistic decision-making might prompt such action, particularly if the industry felt that the
Smokers' Compensation system could be dismantled if it failed to produce results. But even were
it the case that manufacturers could not manage to cooperate in that way, it is not clear that
administrative regulators could be sufficiently competent to sort out any informational disputes and
competing claims among manufacturers.
249. Garner, supra note 1 34, at 3 1 6-1 7.
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manufacturers' liability in the aggregate. If, however, certain brands are
"starter" cigarettes, or for other reasons are smoked disproportionately for
shorter periods of time, those brands would be underdeterred. Another
option would be to give a larger share of the liability to the company
producing the first brand smoked. This "addiction penalty" might be
warranted for a number of reasons. For example, first-brands are arguably
more costly in that they create the addiction. Assigning greater liability to the
manufacturer of the first cigarette smoked may further deter tobacco
companies from marketing to children and nonsmokers. They would
presumably place a greater premium on converting existing smokers, for
whom the liability risks are lower, than creating new smokers. Moreover,
the toxins of the first brands may be more dangerous, other things being
equal, inasmuch as those toxins linger in a smoker's body for more years
than do those of later-smoked brands. That point suggests a third non-pro
rata option, which is to weight liability according to estimated marginal
damage. If the evidence shows .that smoking for five years is relatively
harmless, and that the cigarettes smoked between years six and ten are more
destructive, the system might put greater liability on those manufacturers of
brands smoked between years six and ten.
2. Danger Quotients

To further encourage tobacco companies to develop safer cigarettes, pro
rata liability allocations might be refined by establishing and regularly
updating a danger quotient for each brand of cigarette. A science panel
might, for instance, use data, including those created through the Smokers '
Compensation system, to run epidemiological regression analysis in order to
identify which cigarettes were most dangerous, holding other variables
constant. 250 With that information, each brand of cigarette would be assigned
a quotient indicating its danger level. After allocating liability, for example
according to number of cigarettes smoked or length of time each brand was
smoked, the tribunal would adjust the allocation amounts based on the
relative danger quotients of the relevant brands.251 To further refine the

250. Cf Hanson & Logue, supra note 3, at 1274, 1 292 (suggesting ways in which an ex post incentive
based system might create valuable information).
25 1 . For example, assume the manufacturers of Brands A and B are initially adjudged to be liable for
40% and 60% respectively of a claimant's damages, and that the danger quotients of their brands
are 8 for A and 5 for B. The final percentages of damages owed by each would be the initial
allocation weighted by the danger quotients, a ratio of 320:300 (40 x 8 for A; 60 x 5 for B), or
5 1 .6% for A and 48.4% for B. Thus, while a claimant may have smoked more of Brand B, the
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system, the science panel might establish various danger quotients fo r each
brand with respect to different diseases. Speaking entirely hypothetically,
it may be that while Marlboro is particularly prone to cause lung cancer, it
is less likely to cause heart disease, and Camel is the opposite. Separate
danger quotients would account for such variations.
By using danger quotients, the system would further accommodate for
the fact that cigarettes are not equally dangerous. All but the last of the
allocation methods suggested above assume that cigarettes are
interchangeable.252 Each method allocates liability pro-rata, whereas the
reality may be that the cigarettes did not play an equal role in causing the
injury. Two parties may each dump twenty barrels of waste at a site, but if
one dumps benzene and the other old clothes, their contribution to the
resulting pollution is hardly equal. The danger quotient adjustment makes
the allocation of liability more accurate, by estimating the relative
contribution of each brand to the smokers' injury not just quantitatively, by
time or number of cigarettes, but qualitatively. Adopting this feature only
makes sense, of course, if the benefit of the added accuracy warrants the
probably significant costs of developing and maintaining the danger
quotients. 253
3. Establishing Brand-Specific Smoking History

Any of these methods of allocating liability depends on first establishing
which brands of cigarettes the claimant smoked. As discussed above, there
is strong evidence that smokers are quite brand-loyal and even more
manufacturer loyal.254 Thus, the smoking history inquiry is likely to be
manufacturer of A would wind up paying slightly more than half of the damages because its
cigarette was more dangerous than Brand B.
252. To be clear, that does not mean that the other methods would not require manufacturers of relatively
dangerous cigarettes to pay more compensation than that paid by manufacturers of relatively safe
cigarettes, other things equal. See supra note 246. More dangerous cigarettes cause more injuries,
resulting in higher payments by their manufacturers, even under a pro-rata allocation system.
253. For reasons discussed below, the danger quotient idea should be used, if at all, only to allocate
liability among manufacturers, not to set the level of damages. If the amount of damages were to
tum in part on the brands smoked, the system would create an incentive to lie about one's smoking
history.
254. See supra note 48. It should be noted that there is some "wiggle" room with respect to liability
allocation. As long as the correct manufacturers are identified, errors in allocation by brand are
irrelevant. If, for example, a smoker smoked five different products, all manufactured by Philip
Morris, then any allocation among brands would result in the same payment by Philip Morris, and
Philip Morris would probably have a fairly accurate sense of relative dangerousness of each of its
own brands. Cf generally David Rosenberg, Joint and Several Liability for Toxic Torts, I S J.
HAzARoous MATERIALS 2 1 9 ( 1987) (arguing that by confronting a manufacturer with the aggregate

582

Southern Illinois University Law Journal

[Vol. 22

manageable, as smokers tend to change brands infrequently. The obvious
source of this information is the smoker. The claim procedure could require
an affidavit by the smoker estimating the number of years and quantity
smoked of each brand. over her smoking life.
Although an affidavit by the smoker would be difficult to verify without
new systems in place,255 the system could be designed such that smokers
would have little incentive to lie. Indeed, it is worth noting that the question
of brand-specificity has not played a prominent role in cigarette litigation to
date.256 For several reasons, the issue would likely be even less significant
under a Smokers' Compensation program. First, as we explained above,
compensation would probably be limited to economic losses for which
people commonly carry insurance. In such a scenario, many claims will be
brought by insurance companies in subrogation. Since the smoker would not
be collecting the damages, the smoker would have no reason to lie about the
brands he smoked. More fundamentally, however, as long as the amount of
liability does not turn on which brands were smoked, neither smoker nor
insurer will have an interest in filing a claim against a particular
manufacturer. The brands smoked would dictate only the source of the
damage payments, not the amount.257 In any event, insofar as the system did
create an incentive to lie about what brand or brands a claimant smoked,
substantial fines for intentional misrepresentation could further diminish the
likelihood that a smoker would lie about his or her smoking history. 258

255.
256.
25 7.

258.

relative risk, the manufacturer would take optimal precautions and charge the right price with
respect to each of its brands). As the number of manufacturers involved in a given claim increased,
it would become more important to make accurate brand-or manufacturer-specific causal
determinations. Moreover, even if a smoker smoked only one manufacturer's brands, the
manufacturer may itself benefit if a reasonably accurate brand-specific causal link can be
established. See Hanson & Logue, supra note 3, at 1274.
One such verification system is the cigarette card. See supra notes 235-42 and accompanying text.
Interview with Daynard and Wilner, supra note 2 1 1 .
This proposition does not mean that all cigarettes must be treated equally. Adoption of the damage
quotient proposal would not create an incentive to lie about which brands a claimant smoked'. In
the proposal above, the danger quotients would be used to alter the allocation of liability among
manufacturers, not to fix the amount ofliability.
Another way oflooking at this question is through the lens of the accuracy-administrability trade
off. The accuracy of the liability calculations, and consequently the deterrence function of the
system, might be enhanced by factoring the smokers' brands into the calculus. For example,
epidemiological evidence might suggest that certain brands are more likely to cause heart disease,
but less likely to cause lung cancer. Others might pose a relatively significant risk of emphysema
but be relatively safe with respect to heart disease. Such evidence could affect outcomes,
particularly in a probabilistic causation system. If brands were taken into consideration, the
probability factors would change, resulting in more or less of a discount in damage awards. In that
case, then, the savvy lung cancer claimant might claim that she or he smoked a cigarette more likely
to cause lung cancer. Such an increase in accuracy would therefore require additional administrative
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V . OTHER ADMINISTRATIVE AND POLITICAL ISSUES
A. Transition Issues
If lawmakers decide to adopt some form of Smokers' Compensation,
they still must determine how best to make the transition from the current
system to a Smokers' Compensation system. This transition presents two
general questions: First, to what extent should Smokers' Compensation
claimants be allowed to recover for losses caused by smoking that occurred
before the adoption of the new program?259 Second, given the relatively long
latency periods of most smoking-related illnesses, when will claimants be
allowed to bring claims for losses resulting from post-enactment smoking?
Although a complete answer to those questions is beyond the scope of this
article, in this section we suggest the types of issues that would need to be
addressed. Throughout this analysis, again, the goal is to provide the
optimal degree of deterrence within the constraints of political and
administrative feasibility.
One approach would be to make the Smokers' Compensation program
purely prospective, in the sense that claims could be brought only for harm
resulting from post-enactment smoking. The rationale for such an approach
might be that, since our principal goal is deterrence, and since past smoking
caused harms are, in effect, sunk costs, the only relevant costs from a
deterrence perspective are those associated with future smoking. Under such
an approach, smokers who brought claims immediately following the
enactment of the program would recover nothing, given that the smoker's
cancer, lung disease, or heart disease-even if attributable to cigarettes-would
not have been attributable to post-enactment smoking. Under a purely
prospective transition rule, therefore, smokers would not be able to bring
claims for several years after enactment of the program. The precise length
of the delay would depend upon the state of medical science regarding how
long it takes for a person's smoking habit to produce one of the covered
diseases.

costs to verify the claimant's smoking history, or risk skewing the results. In this situation, the cost
of verifying smoking history, such as requiring the production of receipts, would likely outweigh
the benefit of additional accuracy.
259. See Hanson & Logue, supra note 3, at 1 30 1 .
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· To illustrate this purely prospective approach, consider the following
stylized example. Assume that, five years after the Smokers' Compensation
program is enacted, a smoker brings a claim; and assume that this person has
been smoking for 20 years-5 years post-enactment and 15-years pre
enactment. If she meets all of the proof requirements, she would recover for
the portion of her costs attributable to the five years of post-enactment
smoking. To minimize administrative costs, we could assume that the last
five years of smoking contributed as much to the smoker's health condition
as the first fifteen years, in which case the smoker in this example would be
allowed to recover for 25 percent of her economic losses. Alternatively, if
we determined that the early years of smoking contributed the most to the
smoker's condition, the percentage for recovery in this case would be
something less than 25 percent of her losses.
In any event, under a purely
prospective transition rule, the percentage of losses recoverable under
Smokers' Compensation would increase each year following the enactment
of the program. And after, say, 20 years have passed following the
enactment of the regime (or whatever period of time is determined by the
standing science panel), the system would be fully phased in; and claimants'
damage awards would no longer be discounted.
Notwithstanding its initial theoretical plausibility from a deterrence
perspective, we almost certainly would not, and should not, adopt a purely
prospective transition approach to a new Smokers' Compensation regime, for
several reasons. First, again from a deterrence perspective, to apply the
system purely prospectively would send a dangerous message to other
industries whose products may pose similar risks but who have not yet been
held liable.260 Moreover, allowing smokers to recover for at least a fraction
of their pre-enactment smoking would increase the incentive for smokers to
bring claims, which may be especially important in the early years of the
program when post-enactment benefits would be relatively small. In
addition, to the extent the system is also intended to serve a compensation
function, retroactive claims are desirable. Allowing cigarette smokers to
recover for at least some of their pre-enactment smoking-related costs would
provide a form of first-party health and life insurance coverage, which will
be especially beneficial to those who are uninsured or underinsured for such
losses.
Deterrence and compensation concerns, therefore, suggest that some
recovery for the cost of pre-enactment smoking would be appropriate. In a
purely theoretical world, in fact, optimal deterrence might require that the

260. Hanson & Logue, supra note 3, at 1 302-03.
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Smokers' Compensation regime be fully retroactive, even to the point of
bankrupting the industry. 261 In our view, however, the current political
climate (and perhaps concerns of administrative costs) foreclose the
option of full retroactivity. So how much retroactivity would be enough
to generate some of the benefits mentioned above, but not so much as
to bankrupt the industry? That will depend on a determination of how
large a financial hit the industry can take without bankrupting many of
the existing manufacturers. And the answer to that question will depend,
in turn, on how much the existing companies will be able to raise their
prices to cover claims for pre-enactment smoking without being driven
out of the market by new start-up companies, who will be required to
pay only claims for post-enactment smoking.
We do not presume to know what that number will be, and we
leave its ultimate determination to the expert panel that would be
assigned the job of the working out the details of the system. However,
for the purpose of illustration, let's assume that all of the
objectives-optimal
deterrence
within
cost
and
political
constraints-would be achieved if, say, one-half of all economic costs
from pre-enactment smoking were recoverable from manufacturers,
along with all of the economic costs of post-enactment smoking. Recall
the example of our 20-year smoker who brings a Smokers'
Compensation claim five years after the regime is adopted. In that
situation, the claimant would be allowed to recover five-eighths (or
62 .5%) of her total economic 1.o sses. That includes the one quarter of
her economic losses attributable to post-enactment smoking plus one
half of the three quarters of her total economic losses that are
attributable to pre-enactment smoking. Again, we have chosen these
fractions to illustrate one approach to dealing with the transition to a
Smokers' Compensation regime, but other fractions could be chosen,
depending upon how the concerns of accuracy, complexity, and political
feasibility are balanced.
B. Preemption of State Tort Law

A central question facing any tobacco regulation is the degree to which
it will preempt state tort law options currently available to victims of
smoking injuries. The Proposed Resolution would, in effect, go much of the

26 1 . Id. at 1304-07.
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way towards preempting tort law in favor of command-and-control and
performance-based regulation. Under the terms agreed to by the industry
and states ' attorneys general, only individual trials would be available to
injured parties.262 The Proposed Resolution precludes class actions and other
consolidations, suits by any governmental entity, and punitive damages for
past conduct. 263 The immunity that the tobacco industry seeks is not itself
unprecedented, but the prospect of immunity from tort law without some new
form of ex post incentive-based regulation may be. Tort claims for most
workplace injuries, injuries resulting from work in coal mines, and injuries
caused by vaccines are all preempted to varying degrees, but replaced with
new ex post compensation regimes.264 Another common example of
regulation preempting tort law is no-fault auto insurance. The preemption
of tort law is not unprecedented, but it ought to be preempted in favor of an
alternative that better meets the deterrence and compensation functions that
tort law traditionally performs.
One possibility is that Smokers' Compensation would not really
preempt tort law at all. Like the Childhood Vacciilation Compensation
Program and the Dalkon Shield Claimants Trust, Smokers' Compensation
could represent an encouraged alternative, but not a bar to tort law.265 Filing
a Smokers' Compensation claim might be a prerequisite to bringing a tort
action, with claimants having the option of accepting or rejecting the
Smokers' Compensation result. A variation on the co-existence model is to
allow injured smokers the choice between bringing a tort claim, a Smokers'
Compensation claim, but not both. Unlike the first possibility, here the
claimants would not know what the Smokers' Compensation result would be
before making this decision. Allowing dual systems accommodates concerns
about industry capture of the Smokers' Compensation system. If smokers
believed that the Smokers' Compensation system was shortchanging their
claims, they would have redress in the courts.266 The maintenance of a tort
option with other alternative systems has also sometimes been justified to
accommodate the rare claims that exceeded the compensatory caps of the

"Proposed Resolution," supra note 4, at 39.
Id.
See supra notes 5 1-133 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 81-88 and accompanying text (CVCP) and supra notes 1 16-133 and accompanying
text (DSCT).
266. Cf David Rosenberg, Of End Games and Openings in Mass Tort Cases: Lessons From a Special
Master, 69 B.U. L. REv. 695, 705 ( 1 989) (arguing that "the opt-out procedure [in class actions]
provides a check on whether the efficiencies of the collective process can be and have been
translated into adequate compensation for victims").

262.
263.
264.
265.
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administrative system. 267 Given a system that proposes to compensate all
economic losses and would deliberately exclude other losses, this rationale
is inapposite. In any event, due to the political constraints discussed above ,
this option is not viable. This system would give injured smokers the upside
of a causation-based compensation system without limiting the tort options

available to them.
A more viable possibility is to focus the claims to which Smokers'
Compensation will be open, leaving other alleged injuries to be adjudicated
in tort law. The width or narrowness of that focus turns in large part on the
questions of accuracy and cost with which we are now familiar. If an
objective is minimizing the cost of the system, one would try to structure
Smokers' Compensation to resemble a world in which all diseases are
signature diseases . Thus, only claimants suffering from diseases such as
lung and esophageal cancer and emphysema might bring claims. Others,
such as those suffering from heart disease and other diseases of less certain
causation, might be left to pursue their claims through the tort system.
Under such a plan, the science panel might be authorized to certify new
diseases for Smokers' Compensation as new epidemiological evidence
emerges . Alternatively, the system might require that all injury claims be
brought in the Smokers' Compensation system unless intentional or reckless
misconduct is alleged. Workers' compensation systems often bar tort claims
for workplace injuries with such an exception. 268
One particular advantage to allowing some role for tort law, even if
limited to cases of intentional and reckless harms, is to preserve its
information-forcing function. 269 As the recent attorneys ' general actions,
particularly the recently settled case in Minnesota, have shown, litigation can
play a significant role in bringing to light information of great importance to
the pu�lic generally · and smokers in particular. 270 Without tort law's
extensive discovery, Smokers' Compensation is not set up to delve as deeply
into questions of conduct. While a fully functioning. Smokers' Compensation
system would theoretically provide information about cigarette safety through
the pricing mechanism, a tort option for the most egregious instances of

267.
268.
269.
270.

See Rabin, supra note 53, at 974 (discussing no-fault automobile insurance).
See supra note 54.
See Rabin, infra note 271, at 1 1 .
See, e.g. Barry Meier, Cigarette Maker Manipulated Nicotine, Its Records Suggest, N. Y. TIMES,
Feb. 23, 1 998, at A l .
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industry deception could provide an important further check on
manufacturers. 27 1
One final option, the one undoubtedly preferred by cigarette
manufacturers, is to fully preempt all tort claims arising from smoking
related injuries. Although workers' compensation usually allows claims of
intentional torts to be pursued in tort as noted above, in most cases absolute
preemption by Smokers' Compensation would mirror the familiar tradeoff
of workers' compensation. A bar on tort claims could be characterized as
the price smokers would pay for the more lenient causation-based alternative
of Smokers' Compensation. This preemption option would, however, result
in a broader, and hence more expensive Smokers' Compensation system.
The best alternative, given the political constraints and the desire to optimize
efficiency within those constraints, therefore might be one that channels most
but not all claims to Smokers' Compensation, reserving some residual role
for tort law.
C. Expert Tobacco Disease Panel
Regardless of the decision-making structure chosen, the complexity of
the medical and scientific issues raised in tobacco-related injury cases makes
a Tobacco Disease Panel ("TOP") of experts a potentially valuable adjunct
of the Smokers' Compensation system. As the legal system has grappled
with increasingly complicated questions of science, particularly with respect
to causation, commentators have proposed various methods of incorporating
facts and concepts that are beyond the expertise of most judges, to say
nothing of juries.272 The American Law Institute Reporters' Study
recommends science panels in mass tort cases when individual attribution
uncertainty is a problem, as it is in tobacco cases.273 Judges too have begun
increasingly to recognize the benefits of and to rely on experts in toxic tort

27 1 . See Robert L. Rabin, No-Fault Compensation for Tobacco-Related Disease, Remarks at the
Conference on the So-Called Global Settlement 1 1, Univ. ofWisconsin Law School (Oct. 16, 1 997)
(on file with authors) ("To me, this constitutes the strongest argument for keeping tort open, even
if a no-fault plan were adopted-that is, to promote this informational function, or, more precisely:
to make sure that the industry won't in the future engage in the kind of misconduct and deceit that
it has in the past.").
272. See Troyen A. Brennan, Helping Courts with Toxic Torts: Some Proposals Regarding Alternative
Methodsfor Presenting and Assessing Scientific Evidence in Common Law Courts, 5 1 U. PIIT. L.
REv. I (1989).
273. A.L.I., APPROACHES, supra note 224, at 343. See supra note 224 and accompanying text (discussing
individual attribution uncertainty).
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cases. 274 Still, while the Federal Rules of Evidence now allow courts to
appoint expert witnesses,275 judges have rarely taken advantage of the
There are several science panels working in regulatory
opportunity. 276
contexts, however, that demonstrate the potential functions of the TDP. 277
The TDP's central role would likely be to develop policies for the
Smokers' Compensation system with respect to the causal connection
between smoking and specific diseases. This function could be modeled
after Ontario's Industrial Disease Standards Panel, which assists that
province's Workers' Compensation Board. The Ontario panel investigates
potential occupational diseases, establishing a position on causation that
determines eligibility for benefits and guides workers' compensation
Similarly, the TOP would develop the presumptions and
boards . 278
probability tables that the Smokers' Compensation board would use in
weighing claims. As in Ontario, the administering body of the Smokers'
Compensation system could refer particular questions to the TOP in
situations in which the TOP has not yet determined causation.279 The TOP
might also appoint a neutral expert to testify in cases involving novel claims

or claims which the TOP has not yet taken up. 280

Another role for the TOP is to establish the danger quotients for each

brand of cigarettes , based in significant part on epidemiological data that
emerges from the Smokers' Compensation program. 28 1 This function

274. See articles on breast-implant panel; see also Justice Breyer Calls/or Experts To Aid Courts in
Complex Cases, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 1 7, 1998, at A l 7 (stating that even though "a judge is not a
scientist and a courtroom is not a scientific laboratory" neutral experts "play an important role in
educating judges on potentially relevant technical matters, helping to make us not experts but
educated lay persons and thereby helping to improve the quality of our decisions").
275. FED. R. EVID. 706.
276. Brennan, supra note 272, at 7.
277. There is precedent for expert advisory panels within the federal government. Troyen Brennan cites
the ATSDR and the Environmental Protection Agency's Scientific Advisory Panel as successful
science panels. These bodies demonstrate, he asserts, the workability of such boards, that experts
are available and willing to serve in such a role, and that the adversarial process is not essential to
accurate factfinding. See Brennan, supra note 272, at 1 8 .
278. Weiler, supra note 1 68, at 1 6.
279. For example, the Ontario Industrial Disease Standards Panel conducted research into the link
between gold mining and stomach and lung cancer at the request of the Workers' Compensation
Board. The panel appointed a strictly scientific panel to examine the toxicological and
epidemiological evidence and reach a consensus on the science, then the full panel factored in
economic and policy considerations before making a finding concerning eligibility criteria. Id. at
1 7. Unlike the model in Ontario, we may prefer to draw a clear line between the determination of
causation and the policy recommendations concerning compensation.
280. See Brennan, supra note 272, at 65 (proposing a Federal Toxic Substance Board that could provide
lists of neutral experts whom courts might appoint in toxic tort cases).
28 1 . See supra notes 250-5 5 1 and accompanying text.
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resembles the establishment of toxicological profiles of hazardous substances
by the Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry (ATSDR) . Under
the 1 986 Superfund amendments, ATSDR is to interpret available
toxicological and epidemiological information to "ascertain the levels of
"282

significant human exposure . . . and the associated . . . health effects.
Like ATSDR's toxicological profiles, the TDP's danger quotients would
"amountO to generic expert testimony by a neutral administrative science
283
panel . "
More generally, the TDP would monitor and sponsor research
into the health effects of smoking and the individual ingredients in cigarettes.
This function of the TDP might go beyond the ATSDR, and involve the TDP
conducting and sponsoring its own research rather than pursuing a limited
mandate.

The TDP thus could play a significant role in Smokers' Compensation.
If damages are scheduled, the TDP could add new diseases to the
compensation schedule as science reveals new connections between smoking
and disease.284 The panel could also establish the average treatment costs for
covered diseases in order to set the schedule . Drawing on scientific and
medical data, it could establish presumptions of causation with thresholds
that reflect the correlation between smoking history and disease. The TDP
could study the interaction of smoking with other factors to set guidelines or
presumptions for allocating causation among potential causes of diseases . If
the system incorporates notions of probabilistic causation, the TDP might

develop a matrix of probability factors for certain diseases. Based on regular
testing of all cigarette brands, it could establish danger quotients. In cases
that raise novel or disputed medical or scientific theories, the TDP could
appoint an expert to assist the factfinder. The panel would also continually
monitor, and perhaps sponsor, research into the health effects of smoking,
and periodically review and adjust as necessary the presumptions, probability
factors, and other science-driven elements of the system. The objective of
such a blue-ribbon board is to base decisions on the best available science
and to establish consistency within the system.

282. E. Donald Elliot, Planning and Managing Mass Toxic Tort Cases, C534 ALI-ABA 605, 626--2 7
(1990) (quoting Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986, § I 1 0(3)(A), 42 U.S.C.
§ 9604(i)(3)(A) (Supp. IV 1 986)).
283. Id. at 627.
284. The silicone breast implants settlement creates a Medical Panel to fulfill such a function. Diseases
may be added to the Disease Compensation Program by the five member court-appointed panel
upon finding that the "then-existing medical and scientific evidence demonstrates that the disease
or condition is caused by breast implants." In re Silicone Gel Breast Implant Prods. Liab. Litig.,
No. C1v. A. CV94-P-1 1 558-S, 1 994 WL 578353, at *8 (N.D. Ala. Sept. I, 1 994).
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D. Financing the System
Although the money to administer the Smokers' Compensation system
might come from any number of sources, it should probably ultimately fall
on cigarette manufacturers and smokers. It might be argued that the costs
of administering a Smokers' Compensation program should be paid out of
general tax revenues, particularly given that all taxpayers-smokers and
'
nonsmokers alike-will benefit from the system at least to the extent that
public and private insurance mechanisms will be spared many of the costs of
cigarette-related banns. The savings of as much as $40 billion per year that
would accrue to those entities currently paying for tobacco-related diseases285
might be expected in some measure to be passed on to consumers and
taxpayers in the fonn of lower insurance premiums and taxes. In our view,
however, the fact that nonsmokers have long had to share the costs of
cigarettes does not justify requiring them to share in the costs of regulating
cigarette market. That regulation of any sort is necessary in this context is
aptly understood as a cost created by the cigarette market and one that should
not be externalized to parties outside that market.
Thus, we recommend the Smokers' Compensation system be funded as
follows. The up-front start-up costs of setting up a Smokers' Compensation
program should be paid for through a single lump sum charge against the
industry, in proportion to each manufacturer's market share over the past
several decades. Once the system is up and running, all subsequent costs of
operation and administration should be charged to manufacturers in
proportion to the harmfulness of their cigarettes. Supposing, for example,
that the administrative costs of the Smokers' Compensation system was
roughly 10% of the program's total pay-outs,286 then a 1 0 % "hann-share
tax" could be added to every dollar of compensation required of each
manufacturer. Manufacturers of more dangerous cigarettes would, quite
appropriately, be charged more in absolute tenns for the system than would
manufacturers of relatively safe cigarettes. One important advantage of such
a harm-share tax is that it would charge each manufacturer in accordance
with the demands each makes on the system. A second significant advantage
is that it would enhance the incentives created by the system to make safer
cigarettes, without also giving rise to any sort of moral hazard problem on
the part of claimants.

285. See infra note 302.
286. See supra note 74-75 and accompanying text summarizing evidence regarding the administrative
costs of some existing no-fault compensation schemes).
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E. Strategic Avoidance: The Judgment Proof Problem and Black Markets
One potential objection to the workability of Smokers' Compensation
is that the lag between the sale of cigarettes and the realization of the costs
of those cigarettes presents an opportunity for manufacturers to evade those
costs. For example, after profiting for twenty years or so, a cigarette
company-finding itself on the verge of paying out a slew of maturing
Smokers' Cqmpensation claims-might simply distribute its assets to its
shareholders, rendering itself largely immune to the threat of Smokers'
Compensation claims. Legal scholars sometimes describe this strategy as a
form "judgment-proofing. " To be sure, the judgment-proof manufacturer
would then be bankrupted by the Smokers' Compensation claims, but only
after many years of profiting substantially and distributing those profits to
shareholders. Moreover, a company expecting to engage in such a strategy
would be able to sell its cigarettes at a price substantially lower than the
prices charged by companies that expect to be around to pay Smokers'
Compensation claims. Thus, to avoid loss of market share and perhaps
imminent bankruptcy, companies would have an incentive to cut prices
similarly, taking the risk of long-run, strategic bankruptcy.
There are several factors, however, that would tend to lessen the
incentive toward judgment proofing. First of all, Smokers' Compensation
claimants are not the only creditors of tobacco companies who have an
interest in overcoming the judgment proof problem. In fact, one suspects
that sophisticated long-term creditors of the tobacco companies would, as in
other industries, find ways to protect themselves, protections that would (at
least derivatively) protect Smokers' Compensation claimants as well. For
example, those lenders might include loan covenants prohibiting (or, more
generally, increasing the cost of) various judgment-proofing strategies-such
as excessive dividends. 287 There are regulatory policies that could be

287. It may be the case, however, that cigarette companies engage in very little long-term borrowing, but
instead rely primarily on large amounts of short-term debt, such as commercial paper. If that is the
case, the lenders would be relatively unconcerned about long-term judgment-proofing strategies,
so long as insolvency was not expected to occur during a year in which the manufacturers have
substantial loans outstanding. Thus, short-term lenders, like shareholders, would be beneficiaries
(albeit perhaps unknowing beneficiaries) of the manufacturers' judgment-proofing strategy. One
possible response to this problem would be to forbid short-term lending to cigarette companies.
Thus, ifthe companies wanted to borrow, they would have to make a long-term commitment to their
lenders not to engage in judgment-proofing strategies; and their lenders would have an incentive
to monitor compliance with that commitment. Another analogous proposal, discussed in the text
below, would be to require tobacco companies to purchase a certain amount ofliability insurance,
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adopted that would prevent manufacturers from evading the threat of future
liability. For instance, as is provided for under the Proposed Resolution,
manufacturers might be required to put up a substantial bond, to ensure that
some assets are available in the future.288 Similarly, as is the case in for
virtually all European corporations, manufacturers might be required to meet
minimum capitalization requirements, which would serve the same purpose
as a bond. In addition, cigarette manufacturers could be required to purchase
a minimum amount of liability insurance which would cover the costs of
future potential liability. 289
It is also worth noting that opportunities for strategic avoidance of
regulatory incentives exist for virtually all forms of regulation. For instance,
manufacturers could avoid the effect of an excise tax by directly or indirectly
selling their brands on black markets (as may be common in other countries
that have substantial cigarette tariffs).290 That evasion strategy would be less
effective under a Smokers' Compensation system because manufacturers
would have to pay for the harms caused by all of their cigarettes, even those
purchased on black markets. 29 1
F. Additional Bankruptcy Concerns
One concern about Smokers' Compensation that we have heard is that
imposing all (or substantially all) of the costs of smoking on the tobacco
companies would bankrupt the industry. For a number of reasons, we
regard the possibility of bankrupting several large manufacturers to be a
politically non-viable alternative.292 Nevertheless, a Smokers' Compensation
system as outlined in this Article could be designed specifically to
accommodate any desired target cost without sacrificing its public health

which would give insurers, rather than lenders, the incentive to monitor the manufacturers.
288. Cf Proposed Resolution, supra note 4, at 28-29 (requiring new market entrants to put up such a
bond). Cf Rosenberg, supra note 36, at 919-22 (describing an insurance-fund proposal intended
to address these problems (and others) and under which claimants would bring their claims after a
toxic exposure but, unlike Smokers' Compensation claimants, before an injury manifested itself).
289. For example, if Philip Morris wanted to continue selling cigarettes, it would either need to post a
bond or purchase a liability insurance policy or perhaps somehow make available some of the assets
held by the parent companies' non-tobacco subsidiaries.
290. See AP, Cigarette Smuggling Probe Eyeing Employees al RJR, BOSTON GLOBE, Aug. 23, 1997, at
AS; Raymond Bonner & Christopher Drew, Cigarette Makers Are Seen as Aiding Rise in
Smuggling, N.Y. TIM�S, Aug. 25, 1997, at A l .
291 . Indeed, for that reason, manufacturers would have a strong incentive to discourage the emergence
of black markets in their own cigarettes.
292. See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
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aims. Indeed, the Smokers' Compensation system can be designed so as to
impose no greater costs on the industry than the proposals currently on the
table.
If, as we have suggested, Smokers' Compensation would cover only
pecuniary losses293 and incorporated proportional liabilitf,94 the liability
costs to manufacturers may not exceed the cost of current legislative
proposals by as much as some might imagine.295 Some of the bills before
Congress may cost the industry as much as $30 billion per year. 296 If
Smokers' Compensation forced manufacturers to internalize the full current
economic losses, the cost would likely substantially exceed that $30 billion
figure.297 As described above, however, we foresee a transition period in
which the manufacturers would not have to internalize all costs of pre
enactment injuries.298 Furthermore, if, as we predict, the incentive effects

293. See supra notes 1 70-87 and accompanying text.
294. See supra notes 223-3 1 and accompanying text.
295. We have not done a detailed economic analysis, but have done rough estimations simply to
demonstrate that smokers' compensation need not be an unrealistically heavy cross for the
manufacturers to bear.
296. For example, Sen. McCain's latest Commerce Committee bill, which he is putting forward as a
bipartisan proposal, could carry a price-tag of $600 to $700 billion over twenty-five years, or as
much as $28 billion per year. See Jeffrey Taylor & Suein L. Hwang, Tobacco Plan ls Criticized by
Industry, WALL ST. J., Mar. 26, 1998, at A l O. A $ 1 .50 per pack tax increase, also proposed, would
likely cost even more, since Sen. McCain's bill contemplates a price increase of $ 1 . 1 0 per pack.
See Bob Hohler, Senators Put a Cap on Tobacco liability, BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 3 1 , 1 998, at A 1 .
297. According to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, in 1993 medical treatment for tobacco
use cost $50 billion. Medical-Care Expenditures Attributable to Cigarette Smoking-United States,
1993, 43 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WEEKLY RPT. 469, 470 (July 8, 1994) (pub. by Centers for
Disease Control and Prevention) [hereinafter Centers for Disease Control]. Id. at 470-7 1 . Another
study found that in the early 1980s, direct health care costs resulting from smoking that would not
otherwise have been incurred totaled $ 1 86 billion over five years. Thomas A. Hodgson, Cigarette
Smoking and lifetime Medical Expenditures, 70 Milbank Quarterly 8 1 , I09 ( 1992). Of that sum,
54. 1 % was paid by private insurers, 1 6% by Medicare, 1 1 .6% by Medicaid, and 1 8.3% by the
smokers themselves. Id. After accounting for health care inflation and Hodgson's 3% discount rate,
Hodgson's calculation of tobacco-caused expenditures is likely to approximate the Centers for
Disease Control and Prevention's figure. Between 1987 and 1993 the health care costs attributable
to smoking more than doubled. Centers for Disease Control, supra note 297, at 4 70.
Although we have not found any studies of the lost wages attributable to smoking, a study of
tobacco-attributed deaths found that in 1985, 45% of all such deaths in developed countries were
of individuals younger than 65. Richard Peto et al., Mortalityfrom tobacco in developed countries:
indirect estimationfrom national vital statistics, 339 LANCET 1268, 1272 (May 23, 1 992). Robert
Rabin corroborates this figure, stating that the average age at which victims contract lung cancer is
65. Thus, he concludes, roughly half ofthose individuals are stricken before retirement age. Rabin,
supra note 1 83, at 12. This number would suggest that fairly sizeable wage loss might be expected,
although smokers disproportionately earn lower incomes.
298. See supra notes 259-6 1 and accompanying text (describing transition options).
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of Smokers' Compensation significantly change industry behavior, then
smoking-related injuries should significantly decline.
In any event, although we believe that a strong case can be made that
cigarette manufacturers should bear the full health costs of their products,
even if they do exceed the costs of current proposals, damages could be
capped while maintaining many of the deterrence benefits of Smokers'
Compensation. If policy makers determine that bankruptcy is a real concern,
they could have tobacco companies pay out damages at a percentage of
actual costs. The central goals of Smokers' Compensation-incorporating
damage costs into cigarette prices and fostering a market for safety-rely
more on accurate relative distribution of costs than accurate total cost
shifting. The system could discount damages to any desirable level, and so
long as the discount is across the board, the objectives of Smokers'
Compensation will be met.
G. The Question of Personal Responsibility
Others might object to a Smokers' Compensation system (or to any
other type of victim-initiated ex post incentive-based system) on the ground
that it compensates smokers for the harms caused by cigarettes and thus
removes from them any responsibility for their own decisions. The goal of
a Smokers' Compensation system is to enhance public health. As Robert
Rabin has noted, where no-fault compensation systems have been adopted,
"a preoccupation with personal morality is alien. "299 For example, a worker
who negligently contributes to his own injury is not barred from collecting
workers' compensation.300 Nevertheless, if another goal of tobacco
regulation were to force individuals to take responsibility for their actions,
no policy response would be superior to a Smokers' Compensation system.301
The concern about personal responsibility presumably derives from an
impression that smokers may indulge themselves with impunity for decades,
then they get to collect payments with relative ease when they get ill. This
picture, however, fails to notice that smokers will have to pay for their right
to make that claim. Smokers will be taking responsibility for their actions
with each pack of cigarettes they purchase, in the form of higher cigarette

299. Rabin, supra note 1 83, at 6.
300. Id.
30 1 . For a fuller treatment of this argument and a related argument regarding the obligation of the
cigarette industry to take responsibility for its actions, see Hanson & Logue supra note 3, at
1350-5 1 .
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prices. The arrangement is no different from the arrangement that currently
exists between insureds and their first-party insurers. Indeed, by forcing
smokers to bear the costs their addiction causes, and by allowing public and
private first-party insurers to bring quasi-subrogation claims again
manufacturers, Smokers' Compensation would result in lower insurance
premiums for nonsmokers. As smokers would effectively buy separate
insurance for most smoking-related injuries, private insurers and government
programs such as Medicaid and Medicare would be relieved of an estimated
$39.5 billion in smoking-related illnesses per year.302 By forcing smokers
to pay the costs caused by their smoking, the system would be far stricter
than the status quo, in which smokers pay a fraction of the actual cost of
smoking and many are covered by insurance. It is the current system far
more than Smokers' Compensation that allows smokers to disregard the
substantial costs that their smoking poses to themselves and to others.
There are several other characteristics of Smokers' Compensation and
smoking injuries that mitigate any problem of personal responsibility. First,
as noted above, we propose limiting recovery to economic damages. Insofar
as individuals suffer substantial non-economic harms that are not
compensated, they do not get something for nothing. Moreover, the harms
caused by cigarettes are, of course, often quite serious. Even to the extent
smokers or their families receive monetary compensation for some of the
costs of cigarette-caused harms, it is difficult to say that the dead or
seriously-ill smoker ever fully evades the ultimate responsibility for her
smoking decisions. Finally, of course, smokers are not the only actors who
should be accountable for their actions. Under an ex post incentive-based
regime, tobacco manufacturers, too, would be forced to bear responsibility
for their actions. 303

302. See Centers for Disease Control, supra note 297, at 470-7 1 . The estimated savings are almost
certainly low, as the figure is based on 1 993 data. In 1 987, medical expenditures attributable to
cigarettes came from the following sources: self pay (21 .0%), private insurance (33.4%), Medicare
(20.4%), Medicaid ( 10.2%), other federal (9.5%), other state (3.2%), and other (2.2%). Id.
According to the 1987 breakdown of source of payments, and the 1 993 health care costs, assuming
no health care inflation in the last five years, Medicare alone would stand to save more than $I 0
billion per year.
303. Recent reports suggest that the Proposed Resolution would have the perverse effect of increasing
net profits of tobacco manufacturers. An ex post incentive-based regime would not have such an
effect.
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VI. CONCLUSION
As this article goes to press, a variety of Congressional committees are
considering a slew of tobacco bills. While anybody concerned about public
health would take heart in this new-found attention to the need to regulate the
market for cigarettes, we are concerned that the current momentum will not
be marshaled to significantly alter the behavior of the tobacco companies.
For all of the Proposed Resolution's discussion of reforming the corporate
culture of the cigarette manufacturers, 304 the incentives of these companies
would, as far as we can tell, remain basically unchanged. Under any of the
proposals now on the table, cigarette manufacturers can be expected to
continue resisting or attempting to evade the spirit of any regulation that
would shrink their market or increase their costs. The Proposed Resolution
and the spin-off bills in Congress would certainly change the regulatory
framework in which tobacco companies operate, but they would not change
the way those companies operate; their priorities would remain the same. 305
We fear that without altering the cigarette manufacturers' basic
incentive structure, attempted regulation will not result in the intended public
health improvements but nevertheless will give the cigarette manufacturers
a tremendous public relations boost and virtual immunity from future
regulation for at least a generation. The tobacco industry has shown a knack
for evading regulations and even turning regulations to its advantage. A
recurrence of that phenomenon is not only the prediction of a sizable
scholarly literature, 306 it is also the lesson of virtually every previous attempt
to regulate the tobacco industry. 307
Indeed, such efforts may already be underway. A recent Wall Street
Journal article provides some disturbing information regarding emerging
advertising practices of cigarette manufacturers in response to anticipated
new restrictions. 308 For instance although RJR retired the famous Joe Camel
last summer amid mounting public and regulatory pressure, "it is now
introducing photographs of real animals, which aren 't barred in the
settlement proposal. A new menagerie for RJR's Winston brand includes a

304. See Proposed Resolution, supra note 4, at 21-23 (describing steps that the parties will take to alter
cigarette manufacturers' "corporate culture").
305. See generally Hanson & I.,ogue, supra note 3, at 1 3 16- 48 (carefully examining the likely effects
of the Proposed Resolution).
306. For a summary of that literature, see id. at 1 1 7-75, 126-8 1 .
307. See id. at 1 1 68 & n.9.
308. See Yumiko Ono, Tobacco Ads Seek Glamor Without Camels, Cowboys, WALL ST. J., Feb. 29, 1998,
at B l .
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perky, bucktoothed mule and a chubby pig. "309 Perhaps, in light of the Wall
Street Journal article, legislators will now remember to ban all
advertisements that include real, perky, bucktoothed mules, but is it realistic
to expect them to anticipate all of the industry's other countermoves?
The political reality is that we will only get one bite at the apple of
comprehensive tobacco reform. It is vitally important, therefore, that any
reform enacted avoid the pitfalls described above-that it achieve, in other
words, public health gains without relying on the industry's good faith. The
Proposed Resolution and its offspring fail this test. Perhaps the broadest yet
least obvious example of this failure is in the proposed bills' emphasis on
preventing underage smoking. We are, of course, strongly supportive of any
efforts to keep children from smoking. Even assuming that the proposed
strategies would be completely effective,310 however, it remains a significant
problem in our view that the regulations may do little more than delay by a
few years the age at which the same number of smokers initiate their habit.
Supporters and opponents of the Proposed Resolution have argued that
the trick to preventing people from ever smoking is simply to make certain
they do not begin smoking before they are eighteen. This theory is based on
the fact that " [t]he FDA and other health authorities have concluded that
virtually all new users of tobacco products are under legal age. "31 1 Evidence
of when smokers start under the current regime, however, reveals little about
when they would start under the proposed regime. We are quite skeptical
of, and concerned by, the apparently widely held view that the current
average age of initiation is somehow predetermined by nature. If one
assumes, as many industry critics do, that marketing efforts have been
partially-if not substantially-responsible for encouraging underage consumers
to start smoking, then one should be seriously concerned that manufacturers
will woo eighteen-year olds just as they have younger children. If
manufacturers can successfully target fourteen year-olds, it seems plausible
that they will be just as successful at targeting eighteen year-olds.
By directing the bulk of the regulatory firepower on reducing youth
smoking as a means to achieving significant public health gains, the proposed
regulations may be squandering a great opportunity. 312 These regulations

309. Id. (emphasis added).
3 1 0. We detail in our Yale article the reasons why many of those regulations are unlikely to substantially
reduce underage smoking. See Hanson & Logue, supra note 3, at 1 322-37.
3 1 1 . Proposed Resolution, supra note 4, at I .
3 1 2. We recognize that there also are a number of provisions designed to increase FDA's authority over
tobacco products in order to mandate safer cigarettes. As we discuss in Part II supra and explore
more thoroughly in the Yale article, however, we do not have confidence that command-and-control
and performance-based regulations alone will have the intended effects. See Hanson & Logue,
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will not change the industry's strategies, merely their tactics. Cigarette
manufacturers will continue to produce and market products with the
minimum possible investment in safety. They will continue efforts to expand
their markets. They will simply change the demographic target slightly. In
short, if we don't supplement more directed regulations with a general
backdrop of ex post incentive-based regulation, we risk frustrating the true
goals of directed regulations. 313
In'stead of launching an arms race of regulation and evasion, the
Smokers' Compensation system gives cigarette manufacturers a stake in
safety. Instead of relying on regulators in Washington to wheedle
information out of resistant cigarette manufacturers and then determine what
are the appropriate investments in safety, the Smokers' Compensation regime
lets the party with the most information make that decision. As we argued
above, to regulate effectively using either command-and-control rules or
performance-based standards, a regulator would need to have much more
information than any regulator now has or can be expected to have in the
future. A regulator would need to know, among other things, how to design,
manufacture, and successfully market less dangerous cigarettes. The reality
is, however, that the only parties with that type of information are the
cigarette manufacturers themselves. By forcing the manufacturers to pay for
the health costs of their cigarettes, Smokers' Compensation gives them an
incentive to keep those costs low . In the current era of privatization, most
agree that the market is a powerful force. And no one doubts that market
forces explain the cigarette industry's basic disregard for public health
considerations to date.
Under a Smokers' Compensation system,
manufacturer profits would be tied directly to the safety of their cigarettes.
Unlike any other proposals we have seen, a Smokers' Compensation system
would harness market forces to align the industry's profit motive and the
public's interest in health.
This Article is not meant as a detailed roadmap to a functioning
Smokers' Compensation system, but simply attempts to lay out some of the
major considerations and some possible alternatives. There are almost
. certainly potential problems and potential solutions that we have overlooked.
We offer this Article not as the last word, but as a contribution to the
existing literature and to what we hope will become a robust policy

supra note 3, at 1 322-42.
3 1 3. As described above, any of the proposed efforts to supplement the leaky command-and-control
regulations with taxes, fines, or penalties are subject to the same fundamental problem-that is, they
create no incentive for manufacturers to reduce the public health costs of cigarettes and may actually
create the opposite incentive. See supra notes 22-25 and accompanying text.
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discussion regarding how to construct an effective Smokers' Compensation
system. Given the large number of policy and technical judgments that need
to be made in order to design and implement Smokers' Compensation, we
strongly recommend that, if there is to be such a discussion, Congress charge
a panel (or task force, or commission), composed of members with diverse
areas of professional and technical expertise and representing a diverse range
of vantage points, with the task of setting up the system.
At the very least we hope that this Article will prompt closer scrutiny
of other tobacco regulation plans and the ways they purport to change
industry behavior. The current window of opportunity is almost certainly
short. We should take advantage of it to change the incentives of tobacco
companies so that, finally, they make the health of their customers a priority.

